The New Partner in Crime: BLS International in Another 2500 Crore Aadhaar Seva Kendra Scam

In the labyrinth of India’s bureaucratic machinery, few initiatives have sparked as much controversy as the Aadhaar project. Launched with the promise of streamlining identity verification and enabling direct benefit transfers, Aadhaar has instead become synonymous with data breaches, fraudulent enrollments, and colossal financial waste. As of September 2025, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) continues to pour taxpayer money into this beleaguered system, with the latest chapter involving a massive contract awarded to BLS International Services Ltd. for establishing and managing Aadhaar Seva Kendras (ASKs). Valued at approximately Rs 2,055 crore—often rounded up in public discourse to Rs 2,500 crore due to inclusive taxes and contingencies—this deal has raised eyebrows for its scale, necessity, and the choice of partner. Critics argue it’s yet another avenue for siphoning public funds, dubbing BLS International the “new partner in crime” in what appears to be an extension of the Aadhaar scam saga.

This article delves deep into the intricacies of this development, exploring the historical baggage of Aadhaar, its persistent vulnerabilities, the specifics of the ASK project, BLS International’s controversial track record, and the broader implications for Indian taxpayers. Drawing from official data, court rulings, and recent fraud incidents, we uncover how a project meant to empower citizens has morphed into a potential black hole for corruption. At over 2,500 words, this piece aims to provide a comprehensive analysis, urging accountability in an era where digital governance should enhance, not exploit, public trust.

The Genesis and Evolution of Aadhaar: A Costly Promise

The Aadhaar project, officially known as the Unique Identification (UID) scheme, was conceptualized in 2009 under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. Its core objective was to assign a 12-digit unique number to every resident, backed by biometric data like fingerprints and iris scans, to facilitate efficient delivery of subsidies and services. Proponents hailed it as a game-changer for financial inclusion, estimating that it could save the government billions by eliminating ghost beneficiaries in welfare programs.

However, the financial outlay has been staggering. Initial estimates pegged the cost at Rs 13,633 crore for the period 2009-2017, with Rs 5,630 crore expended by February 2015. A 2018 McKinsey study inflated this to Rs 60,000–70,000 crore for full implementation. By 2023, cumulative expenditure reached over Rs 11,385 crore, according to some critiques, with total spends potentially exceeding Rs 80,000 crore when factoring in maintenance, updates, and ancillary costs. As of fiscal year 2023, the UIDAI’s expenditure stood at billions of Indian rupees, underscoring the project’s ballooning budget.

Despite this investment, Aadhaar’s utility remains questionable. Courts have repeatedly clarified that it is not proof of citizenship, date of birth, or domicile. In a 2023 Bombay High Court ruling, Aadhaar, alongside PAN and Voter ID, was deemed insufficient for citizenship verification. The Supreme Court has echoed this, rejecting Aadhaar as citizenship evidence amid electoral roll disputes in Bihar. For tax purposes, we rely on PAN cards; voting requires Voter IDs; international travel and citizenship proof demand passports; and driving needs licenses. So, what unique purpose does Aadhaar serve? Critics, including Hotmail co-founder Sabeer Bhatia, have called it an “expensive misstep,” arguing that its $5 billion price tag could have been achieved for a mere $20 million with better technology.

The project’s evolution has been marred by inefficiencies. Linking Aadhaar to services like bank accounts, mobiles, and subsidies was mandated, ostensibly for Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT). Yet, subsidies have been curtailed, and the promised savings—estimated at $10 billion annually by the World Bank—remain elusive amid persistent leakages. Instead, Aadhaar has become a tool for exclusion, with millions denied services due to biometric failures or mismatches.

Persistent Scams and Frauds: Aadhaar’s Achilles Heel

From its inception, Aadhaar has been plagued by scams, turning a purportedly secure system into a fraudster’s playground. Despite claims of foolproof biometrics, vulnerabilities abound. In 2014, a Rajasthan computer operator fraudulently created an Aadhaar card in the name of Lord Hanuman, complete with the deity’s photo and the operator’s mobile number. The card was intercepted only when the post office couldn’t deliver it.

More alarmingly, illegal immigrants have exploited the system. Calcutta High Court judges have noted Bangladeshis obtaining Aadhaar through fake documents. In one 2024 case, a Bangladeshi woman, working as an airline crew member, was arrested in Kolkata with forged Aadhaar, Voter ID, and ration cards alongside her genuine Bangladeshi passport.

As we enter 2025, frauds have evolved with technology. Insurance scams using manipulated Aadhaar cards are rampant, with Uttar Pradesh police probing bogus claims via fake identities. Fraudsters forge documents to obtain policies and file fictitious claims, exploiting Aadhaar-linked processes. The UIDAI is scrambling to curb this, implementing stricter measures against UID fraud.

Phishing scams like the “PAN 2.0” fraud target Aadhaar details, stealing PAN, bank info, and more via fake emails. Fintech frauds in 2025 involve AI-generated synthetic IDs with fabricated Aadhaar and PAN data, as seen in a Bengaluru ring creating over 200 such identities. OTP scams, deepfakes, and WhatsApp traps lure victims into sharing Aadhaar details. A Mumbai woman lost Rs 20.25 crore in a “digital arrest” scam where fraudsters posed as police, alleging misuse of her Aadhaar.

Biometric theft is another frontier. Hackers bypass OTPs using fingerprints from government records, enabling unauthorized transactions. In April 2025, a major identity fraud ring was busted, compromising over 1,500 biometric records across 12 states via counterfeit websites mimicking Aadhaar portals. Cybercriminals even lure citizens with fake Aadhaar update services. These incidents highlight Aadhaar’s insecurity, despite Rs 80,000 crore spent—data leaks persist, and fake enrollments for animals, deities, and non-citizens undermine its integrity.

The Aadhaar Seva Kendra Project: Pouring Salt on the Wound

Enter the Aadhaar Seva Kendra (ASK) initiative, designed to provide dedicated centers for Aadhaar enrollment, updates, and services at the district level. UIDAI positions ASKs as user-friendly hubs to address accessibility issues in rural and urban areas. However, the project’s necessity is debatable, given existing multi-utility centers (like PAN or passport application points) that already handle Aadhaar updates for a fee—typically Rs 50 government charge plus Rs 50 service fee.

In August 2025, UIDAI awarded a Rs 2,055.35 crore contract to BLS International to establish and operate these district-level ASKs over six years. The deal includes setting up 600 centers, hiring staff, and managing operations, with BLS expecting revenues exceeding Rs 2,000 crore. Proponents argue it will enhance service delivery, but skeptics see it as redundant spending on a failed project.

Why invest further in Aadhaar when courts have stripped it of standalone validity? The Supreme Court has ruled Aadhaar lacks constitutional validity as a sole document, and it’s not citizenship proof. Linking exercises yielded minimal benefits, with DBT subsidies often discontinued. Critics liken it to performing surgery on a dead body—wasting resources on something irredeemable.

Moreover, ASKs operate on a revenue model where users pay fees, begging the question: Why subsidize with Rs 2,055 crore from the treasury? If updates are fee-based, private operators could handle it without government largesse. This mirrors broader corruption patterns: Inflated tenders where actual costs are a fraction, with kickbacks funneled to political parties or leaders.

BLS International: The Controversial New Player

BLS International Services Ltd., a Delhi-based outsourcing firm listed on Indian stock exchanges, specializes in visa, passport, consular, and citizen services. Operating in 70 countries with 46 client governments, it has processed over 360 million applications. Its foray into Aadhaar marks an expansion into domestic identity management.

However, BLS’s reputation is tarnished by scandals. In 2023, it faced diplomatic storms in Canada over visa processing issues and was linked to e-residency scams in Estonia. Recent complaints include fraudulent charges: In Toronto, applicants were overcharged for “premium lounge” services, paying $206 for a $106.40 renewal. Schengen visa applicants in India reported document queries as a scam tactic. BLS has also bagged smaller UIDAI contracts, like a Rs 50-crore data quality check in 2023.

Awarding such a massive contract to BLS raises red flags. The firm bids low to secure deals, then allegedly upsells or skimps on quality—hiring interns instead of experts, as seen in government IT projects. In the ASK context, commitments to full-time staff at Rs 30,000 salaries may devolve into underpaid juniors, compromising service. With Aadhaar’s history of leaks, partnering with a firm embroiled in fraud allegations seems reckless.

Why This Qualifies as a Scam: Inflated Costs and Corruption Nexus

The ASK contract exemplifies systemic corruption akin to inflated road tenders or electoral bonds. A road costing Rs 1 lakh is tendered at Rs 10 lakh, with half as bribes to parties. Similarly, Aadhaar’s Rs 80,000 crore yielded a leaky system; now, Rs 2,055 crore for ASKs on a useless document.

Inflated billing is evident: Government websites like e-courts or MCA crash despite crores in maintenance, while private giants like Google stay robust. UIDAI outsources to Infosys, TCS, and now BLS, bypassing its National Informatics Centre (NIC) with a Rs 300-400 crore annual budget. Why not use internal teams?

The scam’s mechanics: BLS commits to 600 centers with staffed operations, but corners may be cut—senior roles filled by juniors, salaries inflated on paper. Fees from users generate revenue, yet treasury funds flow, creating double-dipping. Kickbacks could reach political coffers, as with BJP’s alleged tender-for-donations model.

In villages (70% of India’s population), ASKs promise development but deliver little. A Rs 100 crore village budget builds one road instead of 100 facilities due to inflation. Taxpayers bear the brunt: Higher taxes for wasteful projects.

Impacts on Taxpayers and Society

This scam burdens the public. Taxes fund Rs 2,055 crore for redundant centers, diverting from essentials like drain cleaning or education. Rural youth earn Rs 5,000-10,000 stipends, yet ASK staff salaries are shown as Rs 35,000—funds siphoned.

Socially, Aadhaar frauds erode trust: Identity theft leads to financial losses, as in the Rs 20 crore Mumbai case. Exclusion affects the poor, with biometrics failing the elderly or laborers.

Economically, misallocation hampers growth. Bhatia estimates Aadhaar could cost Rs 136 crore max; instead, it’s Rs 11,385 crore wasted. Cumulative frauds cost billions, per insurance and fintech reports.

Conclusion: Time for Accountability

The BLS-Aadhaar Seva Kendra deal is a microcosm of governance failures: Unnecessary spending on a flawed system, partnered with a controversial firm, amid unchecked corruption. As India marches toward digital supremacy, such scams undermine progress. Public Interest Litigations (PILs) and audits are needed to scrutinize this Rs 2,055 crore outlay. Taxpayers deserve transparency—why fund a “dead body” like Aadhaar? Until reforms address root causes, initiatives like ASK will remain partners in crime, not public service.