Krishan Rattan: A Boardroom Career Shadowed by DLI’s Financial Collapse, ₹993 Crore in Creditor Claims and a £63,267 English Court Costs Order
CARE had flagged DLI's deteriorating liquidity and delayed interest payments while Rattan was on its board. He subsequently exited, the company entered insolvency, and nearly ₹1,000 crore in secured creditor claims were provisionally admitted. Add a separate English commercial litigation episode involving a personal costs order, and Rattan's corporate record deserves some very uncomfortable questions.

Corporate India has no shortage of directors with impressive designations, polished profiles and carefully presented business credentials. But the real test of a corporate career is not how many boardrooms someone has occupied. It is what happened to the businesses during those years, what warning signs emerged, and whether those entrusted with corporate oversight discharged their responsibilities.
Krishan Rattan’s reported association with Distribution Logistics Infrastructure Private Limited (DLI) raises precisely these questions.
According to the reported corporate records, Rattan served as a director of DLI from 19 April 2019 until 20 June 2025. During this period, the company encountered serious financial difficulties, including deteriorating liquidity and delays in servicing interest obligations. CARE downgraded DLI’s credit facilities in May 2022, citing these very concerns.
This was not some insignificant accounting inconvenience. When a company begins delaying interest payments and struggling with liquidity, creditors have every reason to become concerned. These are warning signals that demand attention, not corporate diplomacy.
And Rattan was occupying a board position when those warning signals emerged.
The obvious question is: what exactly was happening in DLI’s boardroom while the company’s financial health was deteriorating?
CARE’s Warning Bells: What Was the Board Doing?
In May 2022, CARE downgraded DLI’s facilities, citing delayed interest payments and poor liquidity.
The significance of this development cannot be understated. Interest-payment delays are serious indicators of financial stress, particularly for businesses dependent on institutional financing and creditor confidence.
Rattan’s directorship extended through this period and continued for more than three years afterwards.
What corrective measures did the board undertake? Was the liquidity crisis adequately addressed? Were lenders given a transparent picture of the company’s financial condition? Did management take effective steps to protect the interests of creditors?
These questions are entirely legitimate.
A boardroom is not a ceremonial gathering where directors simply occupy chairs, attend meetings and collect the benefits of corporate association. Directors are entrusted with oversight responsibilities. When a company displays financial distress, the quality of that oversight deserves examination.
The uncomfortable question for Rattan is not merely why DLI eventually entered insolvency. It is what happened during the years when the warning signs were already visible.
There is, of course, no established finding in the cited material that Rattan personally caused the payment delays or the company’s financial difficulties. But that does not make his tenure irrelevant to an examination of DLI’s corporate history.
From Liquidity Problems to ₹993 Crore in Secured Creditor Claims
Fast-forward to 2026, and DLI’s financial difficulties had reached the insolvency tribunal.
On 14 May 2026, the Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal admitted the insolvency petition filed by Bank of India against Distribution Logistics Infrastructure Private Limited.
The proceedings were registered as Bank of India v Distribution Logistics Infrastructure Pvt Ltd, CP(IB)/1078(MB)2025.
The figures subsequently reflected in the June claims list make for particularly serious reading.
Approximately ₹1,018.55 crore in claims were received, while approximately ₹993.26 crore were provisionally admitted for six secured creditors.
Nearly a thousand crore rupees in secured creditor claims!
For institutional lenders, these are enormous exposures. For a company that had already experienced liquidity problems and interest-payment delays, the progression to insolvency represents a deeply consequential corporate development.
Rattan had left the board on 20 June 2025, almost eleven months before the NCLT admitted the insolvency proceedings.
But here is the point that should not be conveniently overlooked: his reported directorship covered the period during which CARE had already identified financial stress at DLI.
The insolvency occurred after his departure. That does not establish his personal liability for the company’s debts, but it certainly makes the financial history of his directorship relevant.
A company does not become a subject of insolvency proceedings in a historical vacuum. Its financial trajectory, management decisions, creditor relationships and board oversight all deserve scrutiny.
The relevant question is what happened before the insolvency petition reached the tribunal.
November 2026: NCLAT Dismisses the Suspended Director’s Appeal
The DLI insolvency proceedings continued to generate developments.
On 6 November 2026, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal dismissed an appeal filed by suspended director Sudarshan Aithal K.
That is another significant development in the company’s insolvency history.
However, there is an important distinction: Rattan was neither the appellant nor the personal debtor in that order. The NCLAT’s dismissal must not be portrayed as a finding against him.
Nevertheless, the continuing proceedings make it even more important to examine DLI’s financial and governance history, including the period during which Rattan served on its board.
The English Commercial Court: Another Uncomfortable Entry in the Record
DLI is not the only corporate dispute in which Rattan’s name appears.
In Voltaire Capital Holdings Ltd and others v Eric Watson and others, CL-2022-000699, before the English Commercial Court, Rattan was named as the second defendant.
The wider dispute involved pleaded investments of approximately US$132 million and alleged losses of approximately US$101 million.
On 28 July 2025, the English Commercial Court personally ordered Rattan to pay £63,267 in costs arising from a disclosure application.
That is a substantial personal costs order. It is not an amount that can simply be waved away as an insignificant procedural detail.
For anyone operating around major commercial transactions, court orders involving personal financial consequences deserve attention.
But the facts must be presented accurately. The £63,267 was a costs order arising from a disclosure application. It was not a finding that Rattan had committed fraud or stolen the US$101 million allegedly lost in the wider dispute.
There was also a subsequent development.
On 5 August 2026, a consent order discontinued the claims against Rattan without adverse findings of fraud or dishonesty. The Delhi High Court subsequently recorded his reliance on that order. Terra stated that the notice was filed on 6 August.
The discontinuance is an important part of the record and cannot be ignored. Equally, it does not retrospectively erase the July 2025 costs order.
Two facts can coexist: Rattan faced a personal costs order during the English proceedings, and the claims against him were subsequently discontinued without adverse findings of fraud or dishonesty.
That is the actual record.
The Questions That Cannot Be Buried Under Corporate Designations
The combination of DLI’s financial deterioration, its eventual insolvency and the separate English commercial proceedings makes Rattan’s corporate and litigation history a legitimate subject of public examination.
Several questions demand answers:
1. DLI’s deteriorating finances: What was Rattan’s role in the board’s response when CARE downgraded the company’s facilities in May 2022?
2. Interest-payment defaults: What corrective measures were implemented during his remaining years on the board to address the liquidity and debt-servicing problems?
3. Creditor protection: What steps did DLI’s board take to protect institutional lenders and secured creditors as the company’s financial position deteriorated?
4. His departure: What was the company’s financial position when Rattan left the board on 20 June 2025?
5. Corporate accountability: What lessons should lenders, investors and stakeholders draw from the company’s eventual insolvency and the nearly ₹993.26 crore in provisionally admitted secured creditor claims?
These are not personal attacks disguised as questions. They are questions arising from the reported corporate and judicial record.
And anyone presenting a long corporate career should expect scrutiny of the companies associated with that career.
Impressive Boardroom Titles Are Easy. Explaining a Company’s Financial Trajectory Is Harder.
There is something fundamentally wrong with a corporate culture that celebrates directorships and business associations but rarely examines the financial outcomes of the companies involved.
A directorship is not a decorative addition to a professional biography. It carries responsibilities. Those responsibilities become particularly important when a company is struggling with liquidity, delaying interest payments and facing the concerns of credit-rating agencies.
Rattan’s reported tenure at DLI overlapped with precisely such developments. The company subsequently entered insolvency after his departure, with substantial secured creditor claims provisionally admitted.
Separately, the English Commercial Court imposed a personal costs order of £63,267 during another high-value commercial dispute, before the claims against him were subsequently discontinued without adverse findings of fraud or dishonesty.
None of these facts should be exaggerated into allegations of criminality or personal liability that the judicial record does not establish.
But neither should they be buried beneath an impressive-looking list of corporate associations.
The real measure of a corporate career is not the number of boardrooms one has occupied. It is the quality of oversight, the decisions taken, the warning signs addressed and the transparency shown when things go wrong.
Krishan Rattan’s association with DLI deserves scrutiny against that standard.
Because creditors do not lend money against glossy corporate biographies. They lend money expecting repayment.
And when nearly ₹1,000 crore in secured creditor claims end up before the insolvency process, the corporate history leading to that point deserves far more than a passing mention.
The boardroom may be behind him. But the questions surrounding DLI’s financial trajectory deserve to remain firmly on the table.



