How Did BR Shetty Looted Bank of Baroda Once And Now Demand Billions More While the Public Pays The Price?

The NMC Health case is about more than one failed hospital company.

For years, NMC Health hid more than $4 billion in loans, and Bank of Baroda kept lending to it anyway.

Later, the bank paid $600 million to settle the claims, without admitting it did anything wrong. Now the company’s founder has gone to the Bombay High Court and is asking for $15 billion.

The numbers alone should stop any thoughtful citizen in their tracks. More than 4 billion dollars in previously undisclosed borrowing. Total claims that climbed toward 6.6 billion dollars. A settlement of 600 million dollars paid by Bank of Baroda in 2026. And now a fresh lawsuit seeking 15 billion dollars from the same bank and twenty five other defendants. These are not abstract accounting entries.

They represent the scale of risk that was allowed to accumulate while a London listed healthcare group presented a far healthier picture to investors and lenders. How does a bank of the size and public ownership of Bank of Baroda find itself repeatedly entangled with the same group and the same individual across years of litigation and now a new claim of such magnitude?

NMC Health began as a modest healthcare venture founded by Bavaguthu Raghuram Shetty, aka BR Shetty in the United Arab Emirates in 1975. Over the following decades it expanded into hospitals, clinics, long term care, fertility services and pharmaceutical distribution until it operated roughly 200 facilities. The 2012 listing on the London Stock Exchange opened the doors to international capital and elevated the importance of every reported figure.

Investors who could never examine every bank account or loan agreement relied on the published statements. When those statements later proved incomplete the consequences reached far beyond one company. The question that must be asked is simple and severe. How could more than 4 billion dollars in borrowing remain outside the picture that was shown to the market for so long?

The exposure began in December 2019 when Muddy Waters Research published a report that challenged NMC’s reported debt, cash balances and asset valuations. The company disputed the findings at first. Within months its own independent review committee retained former FBI director Louis Freeh and reported evidence of suspected fraudulent behaviour in historical financial activities. By March 2020 the scale of the problem had become clear. Previously undisclosed borrowing exceeded 4 billion dollars.

Total debt and claims discussed during the insolvency process reached approximately 6.4 to 6.6 billion dollars. On 9 April 2020 the High Court of England and Wales appointed administrators from Alvarez and Marsal to NMC Health plc after a petition by Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank. On 27 September 2020 the Abu Dhabi Global Market Court appointed administrators to the UAE operating companies. The healthcare facilities continued to treat patients, yet the financial foundation had collapsed under the weight of liabilities that had not been properly reflected in earlier accounts.

The administrators’ early assessments described suspected historical fraudulent transactions and undisclosed borrowing involving certain former shareholders, senior management and third parties between at least 2012 and early 2020. The companies themselves stood among the primary borrowers or guarantors. The period under examination stretched across the very years when EY audited the consolidated financial statements.

The administrators later pursued a negligence claim against EY seeking approximately 2 billion pounds or 2.7 billion dollars. That claim was settled and withdrawn in January 2026 without any admission of liability. The settlement terms remained confidential. What does it say about the systems of oversight that an auditor of global standing faced such a claim and that the dispute ended without a public determination of whether the audits should have detected the scale of the missing debt?

Related party payments formed another central strand of the administrators’ case. In the 2025 High Court judgment concerning the EY litigation the court recorded the pleaded allegations of net payments totalling at least approximately 1.957 billion dollars. Of that sum approximately 758.4 million dollars was said to have gone to BR Shetty, approximately 675 million dollars to Centurion associated with Saeed Al Qebaisi and the KBBO group, and approximately 523.3 million dollars to other related parties. These figures appear in the pleadings summarised by the court.

They raise immediate and uncomfortable questions. How were such large transfers authorised and recorded? What commercial justification accompanied them? Where did the money ultimately travel once it left the group companies? The administrators framed their claims as an effort to recover value for creditors. The scale alone forces the public to ask whether ordinary governance and disclosure rules were simply inadequate or whether they were systematically circumvented.

Bank of Baroda occupied a prominent place in the financing of the group. The administrators alleged that the bank had knowledge of or involvement in aspects of the suspected fraud. The bank contested liability throughout. In the ADGM Court of Appeal judgment of 30 December 2024 the court dismissed appeals brought by BR Shetty and by Bank of Baroda on preliminary legal questions concerning the application of ADGM insolvency provisions. The ruling did not decide every underlying transaction. It did confirm that the administrators could pursue certain claims.

In 2026 Bank of Baroda agreed to pay 600 million dollars to settle the claims brought by the NMC administrators. The settlement was reached without any admission of liability or wrongdoing. The bank described the decision as a commercial resolution intended to end prolonged litigation and uncertainty. Yet the payment itself is substantial. How does a public sector bank justify transferring 600 million dollars of resources while simultaneously pursuing recovery of approximately 28 billion rupees or roughly 294 million dollars from BR Shetty in India and the UAE and while holding several decrees against him?

The same bank now faces a new lawsuit filed on 13 October 2026 in the Bombay High Court. Media reports and the court filing reviewed by Reuters show that BR Shetty seeks 15 billion dollars in damages from Bank of Baroda and twenty five other defendants. The claim is structured as 5 billion dollars in direct damages, 5 billion dollars in consequential damages and a further 5 billion dollars for reputational harm directed specifically at the bank.

Interest at 18 percent per annum is also sought. The allegations include facilitation of round tripping transactions, failure to act on more than 100 internal anti money laundering alerts, acceptance of documents bearing signatures that BR Shetty says were forged, and concealment of lending exposures from auditors.

Bank of Baroda responded on 14 October 2026 that it had not been served with the suit, could not comment on untested pleadings, and would defend its interests firmly if and when served. The bank further noted that it continues recovery proceedings against BR Shetty for outstanding dues of approximately 28 billion rupees and that a similar suit filed by BR Shetty in New York had been dismissed in July 2024.

The public is entitled to examine the sequence with care. Documents reviewed by Mint show that Bank of Baroda’s own anti money laundering unit sent alerts about alleged round tripping as early as September 2016. Yet the bank continued to sanction fresh loans and bank guarantees to the NMC group between September 2017 and June 2019. Submissions made by the bank in a Bengaluru sessions court in 2020 confirm the continued lending after the internal red flags. What internal controls allowed facilities to be extended after the compliance team had already flagged the accounts?

How many further alerts were generated and closed without decisive action? The new lawsuit claims that more than 100 such alerts were ignored. Whether those claims survive judicial scrutiny remains to be tested, yet the mere existence of documented earlier alerts already raises questions about the seriousness with which risk was managed.

Personal guarantees form another contested chapter. Courts in the DIFC have examined specific facilities. In the State Bank of India case concerning a 50 million dollar NMC facility the court found that BR Shetty had signed the relevant personal guarantee and ordered payment of approximately 46 million dollars. In separate proceedings involving Punjab National Bank the DIFC Court similarly found overwhelming evidence that BR Shetty had signed the relevant guarantee.

These findings are specific to the documents and evidence placed before those courts. They demonstrate that blanket assertions of forgery cannot be accepted without examination of each instrument. At the same time they leave open the question of how many other guarantees remain in dispute and whether the process of verification at the time of origination was sufficiently rigorous.

The human and systemic cost of the collapse extends beyond the balance sheets. Creditors faced a shortfall measured in billions. Shareholders who had relied on the published accounts of a London listed company saw their investment evaporate. Healthcare facilities continued to operate under the administrators’ supervision, yet the financial instability threatened the continuity of medical services for patients who had no connection to the corporate governance failures.

Depositors in Bank of Baroda, a public sector institution, ultimately stand behind the 600 million dollar settlement that reduced the bank’s profit in the relevant quarter. The question that must be asked is whether the regulatory and internal oversight mechanisms that should protect public money performed their function or whether they were overwhelmed by the complexity of cross border group financing.

The timeline itself demands exhaustive attention. From the 2012 London listing through the years of expansion, the period of alleged misconduct identified by the administrators, the December 2019 Muddy Waters report, the internal review that uncovered evidence of suspected fraud, the April 2020 administration of the UK parent, the September 2020 administration of the UAE companies, the years of litigation in the ADGM and English courts, the 2025 trial of the EY claim, the January 2026 settlement with EY, the mid 2026 settlement with Bank of Baroda for 600 million dollars, and the October 2026 filing of the 15 billion dollar suit in Bombay. Each stage reveals further layers of complexity.

At no point does the public receive a simple, consolidated account that traces every facility, every guarantee, every related party payment and every alert that was raised and closed. The absence of such a transparent reconstruction itself constitutes a failure of accountability.

What remains most concerning is the pattern of unresolved questions. Which individual transactions created the undisclosed borrowing that exceeded 4 billion dollars? Who authorised each facility and on what authority? How were the liabilities recorded or omitted from the consolidated statements that investors and lenders relied upon? What information was supplied to the auditors and what procedures did the auditors perform? What did the banks know at each stage and how did they respond to internal compliance warnings?

Where did the funds that left the group companies ultimately travel? Which payments rested on genuine commercial arrangements supported by invoices and delivery records and which did not? How much has actually been recovered for creditors after all the settlements and enforcement actions? The administrators’ own progress reports describe extensive document collection, witness interviews and examination of related party transactions, yet the public still lacks a facility by facility map that would allow independent evaluation of responsibility.

The new lawsuit adds another layer of confrontation. BR Shetty alleges that bank officials enabled the very transactions that contributed to the collapse and then pursued him on guarantees he says he never signed. Bank of Baroda points to its own recovery decrees and to the earlier dismissal of similar claims in New York. The bank emphasises that it has not been served and that any liability would arise only after a court order.

Meanwhile the ADGM proceedings against BR Shetty and former executive Prasanth Manghat continue with judgment reserved on claims of fraud, wrongful trading and fraudulent trading. The simultaneous existence of claims running in opposite directions only deepens the public’s sense that the full truth has not yet been established in any single forum.

The critique must remain focused on the systems that allowed the discrepancy to grow for years. A listed company reported financial positions that later proved incomplete. An auditor faced a multi billion dollar claim that ended in a confidential settlement. A public sector bank extended facilities after its own anti money laundering unit had flagged round tripping, later paid 600 million dollars to settle claims, and now faces a fresh demand for 15 billion dollars.

Depositors and taxpayers are entitled to ask whether the safeguards that should protect public institutions were adequate or whether complexity and cross border structures simply outran the capacity for effective oversight. The numbers are too large, the timeline too long, and the repeated appearance of the same names too conspicuous for the matter to be treated as a closed chapter of corporate history.

Every citizen who banks with a public sector institution has a stake in the answer. When more than 4 billion dollars in borrowing can remain undisclosed for years, when a settlement of 600 million dollars is paid without admission of liability, and when a 15 billion dollar claim is then filed against the same bank, the ordinary saver is left to wonder whose interests the system ultimately serves.

The facts that have emerged so far demand continuous scrutiny rather than premature closure. Until a complete reconstruction of every facility, every guarantee, every related party payment and every ignored alert is placed in the public domain, the concern remains justified and the questions remain unanswered.