How Much Does A Reel Cost To Your Teen Mind, Not Monetarily, Not Materially, But Mentally?

Recently, a New Mexico state court did something no court had done before at this scale within a single jurisdiction: it did not just award damages, it rewrote, by judicial order, how Meta must run Facebook and Instagram for every minor in the state of New Mexico. Judge Bryan Biedscheid ordered the company to pay $567 million into a youth mental health fund, turn off push notifications for under-18 users during school hours and late at night, set teen accounts to private by default, and bar Meta’s AI chatbots from engaging in romantic or sexualized exchanges with minors — a decree that will remain in force for five years.

It followed a March 2026 jury verdict in the same case that had already found Meta liable for misrepresenting the safety of its platforms to young users, awarding $375 million in damages. The combined exposure exceeds $940 million. Meta has said it will appeal.

That is not an isolated legal event. It is the visible tip of a much larger body of evidence — courtroom testimony, internal company documents disclosed in litigation, epidemiological research, and cross-national survey data — that has been accumulating for years about what happens when the most sophisticated engagement systems ever built are handed to a population whose brains are still under construction. The question this evidence forces is not rhetorical: what happens when a business model built on maximizing time-on-platform meets a developmental stage defined by heightened sensitivity to social feedback, weak impulse control, and an unfinished prefrontal cortex?

Section 1: The Numbers Are Hard to Ignore

Start with exposure. According to the World Happiness Report 2026’s chapter on adolescent social media use, authored by NYU’s Jonathan Haidt and Zachary Rausch, the average American teenager now spends close to five hours a day on social media, split roughly across YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram. A quarter of 13- and 14-year-olds in the US report being online for seven or more hours daily. Pew Research Center surveys from recent years, cited in the same report, have found that nearly a third of teens describe themselves as on some platform “almost constantly.”

The self-reported harms sit alongside that time. In the same Pew data referenced in the World Happiness Report, a quarter of teenage girls said social media harms their mental health, a fifth said it hurts their confidence, and half said it negatively affects their sleep. More than a third of girls, and a fifth of boys, said it makes them feel worse about their own lives. These are self-reports, not clinical diagnoses — but they are consistent, repeated across years of the same survey, and they come directly from the population being discussed.

The picture is not one-sided even in this same data: 63% of teens cited social media as a creative outlet, and 74% said it makes them feel more connected to their friends’ lives. That tension — real benefit and real harm reported by the same respondents — recurs throughout the evidence base and should not be flattened in either direction.

Regret is a separate and striking data point. In a Harris Poll survey of US Gen Z adults conducted for the World Happiness Report, regret about the existence of a platform was low for YouTube (15%) and messaging apps (19%), but far higher for social platforms: 34% wished Instagram had never been invented, 43% said the same of Snapchat, and roughly half wished TikTok and X didn’t exist.

A separate 2023 study led by economist Leonardo Bursztyn found that 58% of US college students would prefer a world without Instagram — and that when asked how much they’d pay to quit for a month collectively rather than alone, their willingness-to-pay flipped from a demand for compensation to an offer to pay the researchers. That detail matters more than it first appears: it suggests many users experience their own platform use less as a free choice and more as a trap they can’t unilaterally exit without social cost.

Section 2: The Psychology of the Feed

None of this happens by accident. Every major platform, including Instagram and Facebook, is built around a small number of mechanisms: an algorithmically curated feed with no natural endpoint, autoplay that removes the need for a decision to keep watching, push notifications engineered to pull users back, and a public scorekeeping system of likes, followers, and comments that converts social approval into a number.

The July 2026 preliminary findings of the European Commission, investigating Meta under the EU’s Digital Services Act, describe the mechanism in almost clinical terms: infinite scroll, autoplay, push notifications, and highly personalized recommendation systems work together to push users into what the Commission calls “autopilot mode,” removing the natural stopping cues that would otherwise let someone decide they’ve had enough.

The Commission’s investigation, opened in May 2024, concluded on a preliminary basis that Meta failed to adequately assess how this specific design — not “social media” as an abstract concept, but these specific features — affects the mental wellbeing of minors and vulnerable users, as required under the DSA’s risk-assessment provisions. These findings are preliminary; Meta has the right to respond before any final determination or fine.

This is where the developmental science becomes important. As the meta-analysis published in the Journal of Contemporary Clinical Practice by Rana and colleagues explains, adolescence is a period of significant maturation in the brain circuits governing emotional regulation, impulse control, and motivation — particularly the prefrontal cortex and amygdala — which heightens sensitivity to peer acceptance and rejection precisely during the years when platforms are asking teenagers to submit their photos, opinions, and identities for public, quantified judgment.

A systematic review published in Cureus by Khalaf and colleagues frames this through “displaced behavior theory”: when people have limited self-control and face stress, they gravitate toward behaviors offering instant gratification rather than long-term wellbeing, and platforms engineered for exactly that kind of instant reward are, on this account, particularly well-matched to exploit an already-vulnerable decision-making system.

Section 3: Instagram, Meta, and the Business of Attention

None of Meta’s revenue comes from time users don’t spend on its apps. Meta’s business model, like nearly every major social platform, is built on advertising sold against attention and engagement; more time on the app generally means more ad impressions and more behavioral data to refine targeting. That is not an allegation — it is simply how the company makes money, and it creates a structural question worth asking plainly: does anything in that model reward a platform for a user, especially a young one, closing the app and not coming back?

Internal Meta documents disclosed through litigation and reproduced in the World Happiness Report’s account of the evidence suggest the company’s own internal metrics tracked exactly this tension. An internal email to Instagram head Adam Mosseri reportedly described the company’s goal as “total teen time spent,” and a 2018 internal message is said to have summarized Meta’s strategic logic toward younger users bluntly: attract people to the platform “young and early.”

Separately, Facebook’s founding president Sean Parker said publicly in 2017 that the platform’s original design question was how to consume as much of a user’s conscious attention as possible, and that the company’s founders — including Mark Zuckerberg himself — understood they were exploiting a vulnerability in human psychology and built the product that way regardless.

It is important to hold two things at once here. First, Meta strongly disputes that current teen time-spent is a corporate goal; in reporting on the internal documents surfaced during 2026 litigation, a Meta spokesperson said the company does not “goal on teen time spent today,” pointing to Instagram Teen Accounts, 60-minute usage reminders, and default privacy settings introduced from 2024 onward as evidence of a changed posture.

Second, none of the internal documents cited establish that Meta wants teenagers to suffer poor mental health — that would be a different and much stronger claim than what the evidence supports. What the documents plausibly show is a structural conflict: the mechanisms that are most effective at holding attention (unpredictable rewards, social validation loops, algorithmic personalization) are largely the same mechanisms researchers flag as psychologically risky for still-developing users. That is an incentive conflict, not proof of malicious intent, and the distinction matters for a fair reading of the evidence.

Section 4: When Social Comparison Becomes a Full-Time Job

The clearest, most consistently replicated finding across the sources reviewed for this piece concerns appearance and social comparison. Meta’s own internal research, again disclosed through litigation and cited in the World Happiness Report, found that across a study spanning Brazil, India, Indonesia, Japan, Turkey, and the US, roughly one in three teenage girls said Instagram made their body image concerns worse, against 22% who said it improved.

A separate internal Meta survey of over 50,000 Instagram users across ten countries found that 37% of teen girls said they often or always saw posts that made them feel worse about their bodies, compared to 26% of users overall. Meta’s internal researchers reportedly wrote that teenage users spontaneously and consistently blamed Instagram for increases in their anxiety and depression, without being prompted to make that connection.

Independent academic research reaches similar conclusions through a different lens. The Cureus systematic review by Khalaf and colleagues cites Holland and Tiggemann’s 2016 review of 20 peer-reviewed studies linking social networking site use to body image concerns and disordered eating, particularly among young women, and Fardouly and Vartanian’s review specifically implicating “appearance comparison” — the act of measuring oneself against curated, filtered images of peers and influencers — as a mechanism distinct from simple time-on-app.

The Rana meta-analysis adds a quantitative layer: across the studies it pooled, body image dissatisfaction correlated with social media use at r=0.41 in an Indian cohort of 300 young adults, and identified upward social comparison, particularly around physical appearance and lifestyle, as the single most consistently cited psychosocial mechanism driving negative outcomes — an effect the underlying research says is more pronounced in adolescent girls than boys.

None of this establishes that any individual teenager’s body image struggles were caused by Instagram specifically. What it does establish, with unusual consistency across independent academic researchers and Meta’s own internal survey data, is that appearance-based social comparison on visual platforms is associated with worse body image outcomes at a population level — and that the company’s own data corroborates what outside researchers have separately found.

Section 5: The Sleep Problem

Sleep is one of the more mechanically straightforward harms in this evidence base, because it doesn’t require untangling complex psychological causation — it is a direct behavioral effect of late-night use. The Khalaf systematic review cites Carter and colleagues’ meta-analysis of 20 cross-sectional studies covering 125,198 children aged 6 to 19, which found that bedtime media device use was strongly associated with inadequate sleep duration, poor sleep quality, and excessive daytime sleepiness. The same review notes that 36% of adolescents report waking at least once during the night specifically to check their devices, and 40% report using a device within five minutes of going to bed.

Pew’s recent surveys, cited in the World Happiness Report, found that 45% of US teens — an estimated 17.5 million young people — say social media hurts the amount of sleep they get. This matters beyond the immediate tiredness: insufficient sleep during adolescence is independently linked to disruptions in the neurological development of emotional regulation circuits and to elevated suicide risk, according to the American Psychological Association’s health advisory referenced across multiple sources in this review. The mechanism is not exotic — a notification at 11pm, or the simple absence of a natural stopping point in an infinitely scrolling feed, displaces the sleep window a developing brain needs.

Section 6: Depression, Anxiety and Loneliness — Association, Correlation, and the Causation Question

This is the section where intellectual honesty matters most, because the underlying research genuinely disagrees on how strong and how causal the relationship is — and pretending otherwise, in either direction, misrepresents the science.

Start with what a correlation coefficient actually tells you. The Rana meta-analysis found a pooled global correlation between problematic social media use and anxiety of r=0.348, and with depression of r=0.273, drawing on a dataset of 9,269 participants aged 12 to 25. A correlation of roughly 0.3 is, in standard behavioral science terms, a small-to-moderate association — it means that as social media use increases, anxiety and depression symptoms tend to increase too, but the relationship is far from deterministic, and plenty of heavy users show no elevated symptoms while some light users do.

A separate meta-analysis by Ivie and colleagues, focused specifically on time-based rather than “problematic” use, found a much smaller correlation with depression (r=0.11) — but with extremely high statistical heterogeneity (I²=95.22%), meaning the strength of the relationship varied enormously study to study, which is itself evidence that simple screen-time measures obscure more than they reveal.

The Indian data reviewed in the same meta-analysis tells a different story in magnitude, if not direction: correlations for depression in Indian adolescent cohorts ranged from r=0.38 to r=0.62, and for anxiety from r=0.45 to r=0.59 — substantially stronger than the global average. A Kerala study of 312 adolescents aged 14–19 found a depression correlation of r=0.62; a Chandigarh study of 541 adolescents found that cognitive interference from social media addiction correlated at r=0.45, which in turn correlated at r=−0.42 with overall mental health — suggesting one specific mechanism (impaired attention and inhibitory control from compulsive use) as a mediating pathway.

The study’s authors attribute the amplified Indian effect size to a convergence of digital exposure with pre-existing offline pressures — intense academic competition, family expectations, and rapidly shifting social structures — rather than to anything platform-specific about Meta’s products in India. This is a genuinely important caveat: the strongest available evidence for a large effect size comes from a context where the researchers themselves attribute much of the amplification to local sociocultural factors, not to a uniquely Indian version of Instagram’s design.

Now to causality, where the sources reviewed here actively disagree with each other. Analyses such as those from Stanford Law have stated that research “has not necessarily shown” a causal relationship between social media use and poorer youth mental health, even while noting the well-documented statistical association. The Khalaf systematic review reaches a similar conclusion: an 11-study synthesis found “a small but statistically significant correlation” with depressive symptoms, but states explicitly that “this relationship’s causality is unclear.”

The World Happiness Report chapter takes the opposite position, and is transparent about doing so: its authors, Haidt and Rausch, state outright that they are “making the case for the prosecution” and have previously published a book arguing social media is unsafe for adolescents. Their argument for causation rests on convergence across seven separate lines of evidence — cross-sectional studies, longitudinal studies that track individuals over time, randomized controlled trials of social media reduction, and natural experiments exploiting the staggered rollout of broadband internet.

On the longitudinal evidence, they cite a study of 6,595 US adolescents aged 12–15 in which heavier social media use predicted later increases in internalizing symptoms — establishing temporal order, which cross-sectional correlation alone cannot do. On experimental evidence, they cite a meta-analysis of 32 randomized controlled trials (5,544 participants) in which reducing social media use produced measurable improvements in depression (Hedges’ g=0.19) and anxiety (g=0.28) — a research design capable of establishing causation, because participants are randomly assigned rather than self-selecting into heavy or light use.

Perhaps the most striking piece of evidence in this entire body of research is what the report describes as Meta’s own randomized controlled trial. According to court filings from Multi-District Litigation disclosed in November 2025 and detailed in the World Happiness Report, Meta ran an internal study with the market research firm Nielsen in 2020, code-named “Project Mercury,” in which a randomly selected group of users deactivated Facebook for one week. Meta’s own summary reportedly found that participants who stopped using Facebook for a week reported lower depression, anxiety, loneliness, and social comparison.

The report states that Meta subsequently dismissed the findings as “tainted” by external media narrative and did not pursue further research along these lines. If accurate, this would mean the company’s own randomized experiment, its own gold-standard causal methodology, produced a result consistent with the harm hypothesis — and the company chose not to build on it. This is a serious allegation surfaced through ongoing litigation, not an independently verified fact, and it should be read with that caveat; but it is documented in court filings, not merely rumored. Meta has disputed the characterization of the study’s methodology and the decision to discontinue it.

Reverse causation deserves equal weight. It is entirely plausible that adolescents already experiencing loneliness, depression, or anxiety turn to social media more heavily as either an escape or a search for validation — several studies cited in the Rana meta-analysis explicitly model this as a “bidirectional and cyclical” relationship rather than a one-way causal arrow, in which pre-existing vulnerability drives heavier use, heavier use exposes the user to more social comparison and potential cyberbullying, which deepens the original distress, which drives further compulsive use. This vicious-cycle model is, on the currently available evidence, more defensible than either a purely one-directional “social media causes depression” claim or a purely dismissive “correlation is meaningless” claim.

Section 7: It Is Not Just Meta

None of the evidence reviewed here suggests Meta is uniquely responsible for these patterns. The World Happiness Report devotes equal space to internal documents from TikTok and Snap. TikTok’s own internal research group reportedly described compulsive usage as correlating with loss of empathy, memory formation problems, and increased anxiety, and executives are quoted internally acknowledging that “the product in itself has baked into it compulsive use.” Snap’s internal Trust and Safety team documented receiving approximately 10,000 user reports of sextortion per month as of 2022 — an estimated 120,000 annual reports that the company itself flagged internally as likely representing only a fraction of actual cases.

The EU’s DSA investigation is itself instructive on this point: while Meta is the current target of the Commission’s preliminary findings, the regulatory framework and the design features under scrutiny — infinite scroll, autoplay, push notifications, personalized recommendation — are common across nearly every major platform, not unique to Instagram or Facebook. TikTok has separately faced EU scrutiny for its own transparency practices regarding mental health impact data.

Where the evidence does suggest some platform-specific variation is in content format and demographic exposure. Instagram and TikTok, as heavily visual, appearance-centered platforms, show up more consistently in the body-image and social-comparison research than text-heavier platforms like the earlier iterations of X or Facebook’s own News Feed.

The Rana meta-analysis identifies “passive use” — aimless scrolling through others’ curated content — as more strongly linked to poor outcomes than “active use” like direct messaging, a distinction that applies across virtually every major platform’s core feed mechanic rather than to any single company’s product uniquely. The available evidence, taken as a whole, points toward an architecture-of-social-media problem — specifically, an engagement-optimized, algorithmically curated, infinitely scrolling feed architecture — more than it points toward a problem confined to any single company’s app.

Section 8: What Meta Knew and What It Did

This is where allegation and finding must be kept carefully separate. A lawsuit is not proof. A jury verdict is a finding, but one that a company can and does appeal. A regulatory preliminary finding, like the EU Commission’s July 2026 conclusion on Meta, is explicitly not a final determination — Meta retains the right to review the investigation file and submit a formal defense before any fine is imposed.

With that said, the documented record — as distinct from the allegations layered on top of it — is substantial. The New Mexico court’s March 2026 jury verdict was a legal finding, reached through trial, that Meta violated consumer protection law by misrepresenting the safety of Facebook and Instagram to young users; the August 2026 ruling adds a public-nuisance finding and a five-year injunctive order limited to New Mexico. A California jury, in a separate March 2026 case, reportedly became the first to hold Meta and Google liable by treating their apps as defective products under products-liability law — a novel and significant legal theory, though again one under active appeal.

The internal documents disclosed through discovery in these cases — the Adam Mosseri “total teen time spent” email, the 2019 study finding that an estimated 12.5% of users showed patterns of compulsive, harm-associated use, the internal debate among Meta’s own data scientists about the addictive potential of the product’s reward structure — are consistent, taken together, with a company that had internal awareness of risk well before its public-facing safety initiatives began. Meta disputes that these documents fairly represent the company, stating that lawsuits “misrepresent our commitment to creating safe, valuable experiences for young people” and that it stands by its record on teen safety.

The Multi-District Litigation disclosure that Meta’s own clinician survey — of more than 1,000 psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists, and social workers — found that 81% believed social media worsens anxiety disorders in their patients and 78% believed it worsens depressive disorders is particularly notable, because it is not third-party academic research or a plaintiff’s expert witness. It is data the company itself collected.

Section 9: The Defense

Meta’s public position, articulated on its own safety pages and in corporate statements responding to litigation, deserves to be presented at its strongest. The company states it has built over a decade of safeguards into its platforms, consulting parents, policymakers, and safety experts throughout. Its centerpiece current initiative, Teen Accounts, launched in 2024 and automatically enrolls all teen users, restricting who can contact them and what content they see by default; teens under 16 need parental permission to loosen any of these restrictions. Meta states that 97% of 13-to-15-year-olds have remained within these default restrictions on Instagram — a figure the company presents as evidence that its defaults, not just its options, are doing the protective work.

More recently, Meta revamped Teen Accounts to be guided by content standards modeled on 13+ movie ratings, and cited third-party data from an AI security firm indicating that Instagram Teen Accounts in default settings showed 68% less mature content exposure than competitor platforms, rising to 96% less under the stricter Limited Content setting. The company has also rolled out parental controls over AI chatbot interactions, including the ability to disable one-on-one AI chats entirely and receive summary “insights,” short of full transcripts, into what teens discuss with AI characters.

Independent scrutiny of these claims is mixed. The nonprofit Fairplay, cited in reporting on Meta’s 2026 safety updates, found that 64% of Instagram Teen Accounts’ safety tools were ineffective in practice the prior year — a finding that directly complicates Meta’s self-reported 97% compliance figure and suggests a gap between account settings existing on paper and functioning as intended in practice. Both findings can be true simultaneously: a high percentage of teens may remain within default restrictions while a substantial share of the protective tools underlying those restrictions fail to work as designed.

Beyond safety features, Meta and other platforms have a genuine substantive case for the benefits of social connection that the evidence reviewed here does not dismiss. The Khalaf systematic review notes that 81% of surveyed students say social media boosts their sense of connectedness to others, and that platforms provide meaningful support for marginalized adolescents — including LGBTQ+ youth and racial or ethnic minorities — who may find community online unavailable to them offline.

The Rana meta-analysis identifies online social support networks as a genuine protective factor against loneliness and isolation, alongside opportunities for identity formation and creative self-expression. These benefits are real, evidenced by the same research literature that documents the harms, and a fair reading of the evidence has to hold both.

The question this section cannot resolve, and that the evidence itself does not resolve, is whether these documented benefits outweigh the documented risks in aggregate, for the average adolescent, given current platform design. What the evidence does show is that the benefits and the risks are not evenly distributed — heavy, passive, appearance-focused use correlates with the worst outcomes, while active, socially connective use correlates with more of the benefits — which suggests the relevant policy question may not be “is social media good or bad” but “which patterns of use, under which design defaults, produce which outcomes.”

Section 10: The Question of Responsibility

Responsibility here is genuinely distributed, and treating it as belonging to any single party understates the evidence. Platforms bear responsibility for design choices explicitly optimized for engagement, sometimes despite internal awareness of risk, as the documents discussed in Section 8 suggest. Parents bear responsibility for monitoring and setting boundaries — analyses such as those from Stanford Law cite Gentile and colleagues’ 2014 finding that parental media monitoring has measurable protective effects on children’s academic, social, and physical outcomes.

Schools bear responsibility for digital literacy education and, increasingly, for phone-free classroom policies, which multiple sources report are producing measurable academic benefits where implemented. Governments and regulators bear responsibility for setting enforceable standards, as both the New Mexico court and the European Commission are currently attempting to do.

But there is a structural asymmetry worth naming plainly: platforms deploy teams of engineers, data scientists, and behavioral psychologists explicitly working to maximize engagement, while the expectation placed on a 13-year-old is that she exercise sustained self-control against systems built by adults specifically to make that self-control difficult to sustain.

The Rana meta-analysis’s own theoretical framework notes that adolescence is defined by “minimal ability to self-regulate effectively” during exactly this period — language that, notably, also appears in TikTok’s own internal documents describing why minor users are particularly vulnerable to its product design. Holding a teenager to a standard of self-control that the platform’s own internal research says she developmentally lacks is not a neutral distribution of responsibility; it is a mismatch between where the technical capability to change the system sits and where the burden of managing its effects is currently placed.

### Section 11: What Should Change?

Based on the evidence reviewed across these sources, several concrete directions emerge — presented here as this article’s editorial recommendations, not as settled consensus positions the sources themselves universally endorse.

Age-appropriate design should be the default, not an opt-in setting a parent must discover and activate; Meta’s own data suggests defaults matter enormously, since the 97% compliance figure for Teen Accounts is a default-setting statistic, not a statistic about users who sought out protections. Algorithmic transparency and independent, externally verifiable audits — of the kind the EU Commission is currently attempting to compel — would allow researchers outside the company to evaluate whether safety claims like Meta’s 68%-and-96% “less mature content” figures hold up under scrutiny beyond the company’s chosen third-party vendor.

Notification limits during school hours and sleep windows, already ordered by the New Mexico court for that state’s minors, is a policy that could plausibly be adopted platform-wide rather than jurisdiction by jurisdiction. Given the well-documented sleep-disruption evidence, night-time protections deserve particular priority. Independent researcher access to internal company data — the kind that, per the World Happiness Report’s account, allowed Meta’s own “Project Mercury” findings to remain internal and unpublished for years — would prevent companies from being the sole gatekeepers of causal evidence about their own products’ effects.

And digital literacy education, integrated into school curricula rather than left to individual parents, addresses a gap that the evidence suggests currently falls almost entirely on families without institutional support.

Conclusion: We Should Not Need a Generation of Casualties to Prove the Point

Nothing in the evidence reviewed here supports the claim that social media is uniformly or universally harmful, or that every teenager who uses Instagram will suffer measurable psychological damage. The same research literature that documents elevated depression correlations also documents genuine social support, creative expression, and community-building benefits, reported by the same adolescents in the same surveys. Flattening that complexity in either direction — either dismissing the risks as moral panic, or treating every hour of screen time as clinically dangerous — does a disservice to the actual state of the evidence.

But the accumulated weight of what has been reviewed here — court findings in New Mexico and California, a European regulator’s preliminary conclusion that core design features were inadequately risk-assessed, Meta’s own internal research and its own unpublished randomized experiment as described in litigation filings, a global meta-analytic literature showing small-to-moderate but statistically consistent associations with anxiety and depression that are substantially larger in specific populations like Indian adolescents, and a body of experimental research showing that reducing use produces measurable psychological improvement — does not require certainty to justify a different standard of accountability than currently exists.

When a company’s own internal research finds that one in three teenage girls say a product made their body image worse, and when that same company’s own randomized experiment reportedly found causal improvement in wellbeing from a week away from the product, the evidentiary bar for demanding safer defaults, more transparency, and independent verification has arguably already been cleared.

Society does not typically wait for unanimous scientific certainty before regulating consumer products with plausible, well-documented risk to children — car seats, cigarette advertising to minors, and lead paint were all restricted well before every dissenting researcher agreed on every causal mechanism.

The evidence reviewed in this piece suggests social media, and specifically the engagement-optimized design choices common across Meta’s platforms and its competitors, may deserve the same standard of precaution — not because the science is finished, but because the cost of being wrong in the other direction, as the New Mexico court and the European Commission have now both concluded in their own ways, is not a cost adolescents should have to keep paying while everyone waits for consensus.