What Does The Financial Lens Say About Lenskart? Can We See The Profit Path Clearly Or The Route Is Still Blurry In Losses?

Lenskart’s much-hyped push toward a $10 billion IPO valuation has raised eyebrows. Behind the PR blitz, its financials paint a murkier picture. In FY2024 the SoftBank-backed company reported revenue of only ₹5,428 cr, up 43% year-on-year, while net losses narrowed from ₹64 cr to just ₹10 cr. (In FY2023 it lost ₹63 cr on ₹3,788 cr revenue.) Growth is decelerating: FY2025 revenue is estimated at ₹6,415 cr (US$755 M), only 17% ahead of FY2024. Crucially, net profits remain elusive. Lenskart is essentially still loss-making, despite years of “growth.” At best, its recently-reported figures show it just cutting losses to low single-digit crores. This is a far cry from justifying a multibillion-dollar market cap.

The math does not add up. Even assuming an optimistic scenario (say Lenskart somehow posts ~₹200 cr net profit on ₹6,415 cr revenue in FY25), the implied valuation multiples are staggering. A $10 B market cap on $755 M revenue is a 13× revenue multiple, and at ₹200 cr profit it would be a P/E of ~425×. In any sensible world, such multiples are absurd. For context, consider Lenskart’s peers: global eyewear giant EssilorLuxottica (owners of Ray-Ban, Oakley, etc.) did ~$30 B in revenue and ~$4 B net profit in the last year, yet its market cap is only about $130 B (≈4× sales).

Even Warby Parker, a fast-growing D2C eyewear brand in the West generated ~$771 M revenue in FY2024 (losing ~$20 M), and trades at just $2.8 B market cap (≈3.6× sales). And India’s Titan Company (parent of Titan Eye+) did roughly ₹57,800 cr ($7 B) revenue in FY2025, with ₹3,337 cr profit, for a ~$34–37 B market cap (~5× sales). Titan’s trailing P/E is on the order of 80–90×, far below Lenskart’s implied 400×+.

Through the financial lens, Lenskart’s profit story is cloudy and its current valuation appears wildly out of focus. In other words, the financial picture is stark: hype vs. reality. Lenskart’s 13× sales multiple dwarfs peers (Essilor ~4×, Warby ~3.6×, Titan ~5×). And its P/E (infinite or 400×+) would eclipse the ~30–90× seen at profitable eyewear firms. Yet promoters are pitching a $10 B valuation. This level of irrational exuberance conjures memories of past IPO manias.

Let’s start with the Slowing Growth and Lingering Losses at Lenskart

Growth has softened. After 43% in FY24, Lenskart’s revenue growth has plunged to ~17% in FY25. This slowdown is striking for a company of its size. The absolute numbers remain modest: ₹5,428 cr in FY24 and ~₹6,415 cr in FY25 (approx. US$840 M annual run-rate). More importantly, profitability is still missing. Its FY24 net loss was ₹10 cr; any “profit path” is purely speculative. Even as it claims to be EBITDA-positive (Economic Times notes ₹856 cr EBITDA FY24), net profits have been zero or negative. (Notably, Lenskart’s CEO invested further in manufacturing, hinting at pushing for future profits, but we have no proof of actual net earnings yet.)

Investors should note that Lenskart’s own disclosures avoid highlighting net profit. Despite reporting operational metrics to sustain optimism, the bottom line remains red. For FY24 the firm only penned loss figures, and FY25’s results (from regulatory filings) likewise show net loss (if any profit exists, it’s not public yet). With growth decelerating, there is no clear roadmap to a sustainable profit model. Meanwhile, marketing and expansion costs are still high: marketing spend rose 20% to ₹352 cr in FY24 as Lenskart keeps expanding its omnichannel footprint (2,500+ stores, plus apps). The result is a stretched margin profile. In short, the “profit path” is not just unclear; it’s practically invisible in the numbers.

What about the IPO Plans and Sky-High Valuation?

Lenskart’s IPO aim of raising around $1 billion at a $10 B valuation is startling given its financial reality. According to Bloomberg, Lenskart is preparing a DRHP for a ₹8–9 lakh crore valuation ($10 B). Investors (Abu Dhabi’s ADIA, KKR, TPG, Fidelity, Temasek, SoftBank, etc.) have poured in hundreds of millions at valuations far lower. For instance, a June 2024 round saw Fidelity/Temasek buy $200 M at a $5 B valuation. Only months before the IPO, founder Peyush Bansal reportedly is buying back shares from existing investors at $1 B valuation, which is one-tenth of the IPO target. In a Moneycontrol’s article, nearly all major shareholders (SoftBank, Chiratae, TR Capital, etc.) were willing to sell at that $1 B mark.

These contradictory prices tell the story: the company itself is valuing Lenskart at 2019 levels again, not at $10 B. Fidelity’s latest internal mark is “only” $6.1 B. Lenskart’s asking price for public investors is thus 2×–10× what insiders implicitly believe. This absurd disconnect suggests a classic IPO hype cycle: promoters dream big, while smart money quietly cuts losses. Investors should be wary: paying for the $10 B banner is essentially buying air at almost any reasonable metric.

Eyewear Giants vs. Lenskart’s Hype

Eyewear business fundamentals make Lenskart’s valuation even harder to swallow. Its flagship competitor, EssilorLuxottica (OTC: ESLOY), is a global eyewear cash machine. In FY2024 EssilorLuxottica did over $30 billion in revenue and about $4 billion net profit, thanks to high-margin lenses (60–65% gross margin) and iconic brands (Ray-Ban, Oakley). Despite that scale and profitability, EssilorLuxottica’s market cap is roughly $130 B (around 4× sales, ~32× earnings) which is far below Lenskart’s 13×/400× assumption. Note Essilor is a mature firm growing ~6% annually; Lenskart can’t claim better fundamentals than this global leader, yet wants to trade at triple the revenue multiple.

Warby Parker (NYSE: WRBY) is Lenskart’s closest peer in strategy: D2C retail plus some stores. Warby grew revenues 15.2% to $771.3 M in 2024 and hopes for ≈$880 M in 2025 (guidance ~14–16% growth, similar to Lenskart’s ~17% slowdown). Warby has flirted with profitability: it lost $20.4 M GAAP in 2024 but forecasts adjusted EBITDA ~11% margin next year. Yet Warby’s market cap is only ~$2.8 B (≈3.6× 2024 revenue), implying a fraction of the value Lenskart seeks for similar revenue scale. Even if Lenskart could match Warby’s modest profits, it would deserve only 2–4× sales, not 13×.

Domestically, Titan Company Ltd (a conglomerate including Titan Eye+) has scaled to ₹57,818 cr revenue (FY25) ($7.0 B) with ₹3,337 cr profit. Its market cap is about ₹2.7 lakh cr ($36 B), a 5× sales multiple with P/E on the order of 80× (and that includes the gold-jewelry business). Titan’s “Eye+” business is a tiny sliver of this, yet Titan as a whole trades at far lower multiples than Lenskart. In short, all credible comparables, global or domestic, trade at single-digit multiples, not the double-digits Lenskart claims.

Table: 2024/2025 financials and multiples for Lenskart and peers.

Lenskart P/E is astronomical given very low profit; if profit is zero, P/E is infinite or undefined.

The gap is stark. Lenskart’s 13×/425× stands out as an outlier, suggesting irrational pricing. One can only conclude the “$10 B IPO valuation” is based on hope and hype, not hard fundamentals.

Investor Backing and Inflated Expectations

Why the inflation? Lenskart has raised over $1.08 billion through 19 funding rounds. Investors include heavyweights: SoftBank Vision Fund (led a $275 M round in 2019 at $1B+ valuation), KKR, Temasek, Alpha Wave (Falcon Edge), ADIA, TPG, ChrysCapital, and others. Each round ratcheted up valuation: 2019 ($1B+), mid-2021 ($2.5B), mid-2022 ($4.5B), early-2023 ($4.5B), mid-2024 ($5B). SoftBank’s famed (and sometimes infamous) Vision Fund took note early, but remember what happened with SoftBank’s other Indian bets (Ola, Paytm, Oyo) after aggressive mark-ups.

Even as Lenskart grew top-line, investors could see dwindling margins. Fidelity recently marked up its Lenskart holding to $6.1 B, but even Fidelity’s internal math seems to fall well short of $10 B. That’s why founder Bansal is buying shares at near-$1 B prices: existing investors (SoftBank, TR Capital, Chiratae, Kedaara, etc.) are cashing out if possible. By squeezing retail IPO investors at $10 B for itself while insiders bail at $1–6 B, this resembles a classic “pump-and-dump” flag.

Financial analysts have been sounding alarms: one blog noted that Lenskart’s promised IPO trajectory is “Paytm 2.0” territory, given the huge valuation gap. (Indeed, Lenskart’s own CFO has reportedly resigned pre-IPO, signaling internal concerns.) Even if management insists on future profitability, institutional caution is palpable. Billion-dollar bets like these typically leave retail holders holding the bag if growth stalls.

IPO Risks: Lessons from Paytm, Zomato and Others

For retail investors, the Lenskart IPO carries clear risks. History is littered with dream IPOs that turned into nightmares. Paytm (One97 Communications), for example, went public in Nov 2021 at ~₹18,300 cr ($20B) valuation, riding digital payments hype. Its shares crashed 27% on Day 1 and have languished since as the company never delivered profits. Analysts then bluntly called Paytm’s offering “overvalued” and warned of regulatory hurdles. That story should be a cautionary tale: exorbitant valuation + no profits = disaster for listing gains.

Closer to Lenskart’s domain, several tech unicorn IPOs in India have disappointed. Zomato’s 2021 IPO was oversubscribed 38×, yet after initial highs the stock fell and only later recovered (it only turned modestly profitable years later). Nykaa’s 2021 IPO also saw huge buzz but traded below issue price for a long time. Even outside tech: RELIANCE POWER (2008) and DLF (2007) are famous for miserable post-IPO performance. A recent analysis lists Paytm, Cafe Coffee Day, Reliance Power, DLF among India’s biggest IPO flops. In many of these cases, overvaluation and weak fundamentals were central to the wipeout. IPO investors who chase only sizzle often get burned when the steak fails to materialize.

Other markets are equally instructive. The U.S. saw its own tech IPO hangovers in the 2020s: Peloton, Oyo, and others soared on IPO day, then cratered. These lessons matter: when companies sell story, not profits, post-listing reality can implode.

Key Red Flags for Retail Investors

Before buying into Lenskart’s IPO frenzy, retail investors should heed warning signs:

• Unrealistic valuation – 13×+ revenue multiple vs. profitable peers at 3–5×. 
• No profit visibility – Lenskart’s bottom line is still negative, unlike Zomato at IPO time or established retailers. 
• Escalating IPO hype – Founders buying at sharply lower valuations while public asked to pay far more. 
• Heavy fragmentation – Eyewear is a crowded, margin-pressured market. Titan’s success came from jewelry; its eyewear arm alone is small. 
• Precedent of tech IPO busts – Paytm’s blow-up, others show sky-high IPO hopes can evaporate quickly.
  

For example, the Paytm IPO was instantly labeled a “failure” as shares plunged 27% on day one. If Lenskart enters public markets at this valuation, it risks a similar fate if growth or profits disappoint. The fact that its peer Warby trades at less than one-third Lenskart’s implied multiple, despite similar scale, is telling that the market isn’t honoring Lenskart’s premium unless hyper-growth proves true.

At The End: Clear Sight or Cloudy Outlook?

At best, Lenskart’s financial lens shows a company still groping toward profitability, with growth slowing and losses remaining. At worst, it’s a man behind the curtain hyping an IPO with little substance to justify it. The contrast with global giants like EssilorLuxottica and even India’s Titan is stark; none of them command anywhere near Lenskart’s implied multiples.

Retail investors should approach with skepticism. An IPO priced on hope rather than bookings often leaves investors short-sighted. History suggests that extreme pre-IPO valuations (relative to fundamentals) are frequently met with post-listing disappointments (as seen with Paytm and others). Unless Lenskart can suddenly reveal a clear, profitable model (beyond “we’ll build more stores and spend on marketing”), the route ahead looks blurry.

In short: the financial data suggests caution. The only clear profit path at present seems to be back into the books for beleaguered early investors, not yet for new public ones. Anyone evaluating this IPO should remember that even the clearest vision can be distorted by a wrong financial lens.