There is a question sitting conspicuously in the middle of the Ankiti Bose–Inventiva litigation that deserves an answer from the documents themselves:

If the original defamation proceedings in Dwarka had already secured ex-parte interim protection for Ankiti Bose, why was a separate suit subsequently instituted before the Delhi High Court—while the original Dwarka proceedings were still carrying outstanding compliance directions?

That is not a rhetorical question invented by a newspaper. It emerges from the court record.

And the more closely the orders are read, the more questions appear.

The record presently available does not establish that Bose’s Dwarka suit was formally withdrawn before the High Court proceedings were instituted. Nor does it establish that the allegations of forgery or perjury against her have been proved. Those are matters still requiring judicial determination.

But the documents do establish something more uncomfortable: the sequence contains a disputed plaint, a judicial direction to produce the original, a direction to file an explanatory affidavit on citizenship, separate Section 379 BNSS proceedings concerning alleged false statements/documents, and then a separate High Court action concerning later publications.

That chronology deserves scrutiny.

The story did not begin in Delhi High Court

The first 2026 defamation proceeding was CS DJ ADJ 744/2026, Ankiti Bose v. Nitin Naresh & Ors., before the South-West District, Dwarka Courts.

The case arose after a 30 May 2026 Inventiva article concerning Bose. The Delhi High Court’s later order expressly records that Bose first approached the Dwarka District Court and that, on 8 June 2026, that court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction directing removal of the impugned article and restraining further defamatory publications.

The relief sought in the original Dwarka proceeding was extensive. The application asked for removal of the article, restraint against republication and dissemination, and restrictions upon further allegations concerning criminal conduct, fraud, misappropriation, money laundering and similar matters.

So the legal record does not support the loose claim that Inventiva had simply been left without protection. The plaintiff had already obtained significant interim protection from the first court she approached.

That is the starting point from which the subsequent litigation becomes interesting.

Then came the Order VII Rule 11 challenge

The defendants did not simply accept the initial proceedings.

They filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint.

And the objections were not confined to a technical court-fee dispute.

The 6 August 2026 order records objections concerning:

• court fee purchased in another person’s name;
• the identity/role of the person who purchased the court fee;
• Bose’s claimed Indian citizenship and material referring to her status in Dubai;
• inconsistency between the stated place of execution and verification of an affidavit;
• discrepancies in paragraph numbering;
• and allegations concerning the appearance/originality of signatures on the pleadings and affidavits.

This is where the narrative becomes considerably less straightforward.

The Court did not reject the plaint—but it did not simply brush away every objection either

A careful reading of the 6 August order is essential.

The Court rejected the proposition that the court-fee issue, by itself, warranted rejection under Order VII Rule 11. It found the plaint adequately valued and the court fee adequate.

But on the physical plaint, the Court made a striking observation.

After examining the hard copy, the Court recorded that the plaint “does seem to be a scanned copy on careful scrutiny.”

The Court therefore directed the plaintiff to produce the original and expressly stated that failure to do so within 15 days would make the plaint amenable to rejection.

That is a judicial observation. It is not an accusation made by Inventiva.

There is an enormous difference.

The allegation that a document is forged is one thing.

A court recording after scrutiny that a physical plaint appears to be a scanned copy and ordering production of the original is quite another.

The distinction should be maintained.

And the nationality question was not finally decided either

Another major issue raised by the defence concerned Bose’s nationality.

The defendant relied upon material from another proceeding in which, according to the order, a submission had been recorded that Bose was a “national of Dubai” and unable to travel to India because of the war in the Middle East.

The defence contrasted that with the Indian passport/Aadhaar material relied upon in the Dwarka litigation.

The Court did not conclude that Bose had made a false declaration.

Instead, it said the material then before it was insufficient to conclusively establish that she was not an Indian citizen and directed her to file an affidavit explaining her nationality/citizenship position. Crucially, the Court preserved the possibility of consequences if a false claim were subsequently established, including vacation of the interim injunction.

That is precisely why responsible reporting must say:

There was a judicially recorded discrepancy requiring explanation.

It must not say:

The Court proved Bose had fabricated her nationality.

The latter proposition is not established by the orders presently available.

So why move toward another High Court proceeding?

On 24 August 2026, a separate proceeding was instituted in the Delhi High Court:

CS(OS) 756/2026 — Ankiti Uday Bose v. Nitin Naresh & Ors.

The High Court recorded that the suit sought relief concerning not merely the original 30 May publication but a series of subsequent articles/publications.

The High Court specifically identified publications dated in July and August 2026 and recorded Bose’s case that the publications continued despite the earlier Dwarka order.

The High Court subsequently restrained Defendants 1–5 from disseminating identified articles through LinkedIn or other social-media accounts and restrained publication of further articles having the effect of restraining Bose from exercising her legal rights.

So there is a legal distinction between the two proceedings.

The High Court suit may have been based upon subsequent publications, additional defendants or a new cause of action. The High Court’s order itself is framed around the later publications rather than simply repeating the original 30 May article.

But that leaves the central question unanswered.

Where is the order withdrawing the Dwarka case?

This is the factual question that should not be buried beneath legal rhetoric.

The publicly available material I reviewed does not establish a formal withdrawal of CS DJ ADJ 744/2026 before the institution of CS(OS) 756/2026.

In fact, the record supplied by you creates an awkward chronological problem.

On 25 August 2026, the day after the Delhi High Court’s order, the Dwarka Court was still dealing with the original case.

Bose’s counsel sought time to place the Delhi High Court order on record.

The defendant’s counsel pointed out that there were outstanding compliance obligations arising from the 6 August order.

The Dwarka Court directed compliance and fixed the matter for 9 October 2026.

So, at least on the record available to us:

the Dwarka case had not simply vanished.

It was still on the court’s docket.

It still had compliance directions.

It still had a future date.

And the defendant was still pressing compliance.

That produces a legitimate investigative question:

Was the Delhi High Court action actually a replacement for the Dwarka litigation, or was it a separate proceeding concerning subsequent publications and additional reliefs while the original proceedings remained pending?

The answer matters enormously.

And at present, the documents do not justify claiming that a formal withdrawal had already occurred.

The contempt question is equally uncomfortable—but must be asked precisely

The High Court order records Bose’s allegation that further publications appeared despite the 8 June order. It lists dates including 14 July, 15 July, 17 July and 27 July, followed by further August publications.

That raises an obvious legal question:

If the argument was that the defendants had violated an existing injunction, why not pursue the ordinary enforcement/contempt route before the court that issued the injunction?

But there is an important legal qualification.

A contempt proceeding is not mechanically triggered by every alleged violation. Civil contempt ordinarily requires wilful disobedience of the court’s order; a dispute concerning whether a later publication falls within the exact scope of the earlier injunction can require judicial examination. The statutory framework for contempt is therefore different from simply filing another substantive civil suit.

And the later publications might constitute fresh causes of action.

So the fair question is not:

“Why didn’t Bose file contempt?”

as though contempt were legally mandatory.

The stronger and more defensible question is:

What was the procedural reason for pursuing fresh High Court injunctive proceedings in relation to later publications instead of seeking enforcement of the earlier Dwarka injunction—and was that choice explained to the Dwarka Court?

That is a question the available orders do not conclusively answer.

Then there is the most uncomfortable document question: where is the original?

This issue deserves far more attention than it has received.

The 6 August order did not merely discuss abstract allegations about signatures.

The Court physically examined the hard copy.

It recorded that the plaint appeared to be a scanned copy.

It ordered production of the original.

And it attached a consequence: failure to comply within 15 days could make the plaint amenable to rejection.

Yet on 25 August the defendant was still specifically raising the compliance issue before the Dwarka Court.

That makes the appropriate investigative question very simple:

What original document was ultimately produced, when was it produced, and where is the order recording its production and acceptance?

That question should be answerable from the court file.

And until it is answered, nobody—including Inventiva—should turn an allegation into a fact.

The Section 379 BNSS proceedings make the document dispute even more serious

The 15-page application supplied in this case invokes Section 379 BNSS read with Section 215 BNSS and asks the Court to consider whether an inquiry concerning offences affecting the administration of justice is warranted in connection with the preparation, verification and use of documents in the proceedings.

The application specifically focuses on alleged discrepancies relating to execution, verification, paragraph numbering and the nature of the affidavit/document relied upon in the litigation.

This is not a trivial procedural provision.

Section 379 BNSS is the successor procedural mechanism to the former Section 340 CrPC for offences connected with proceedings in court and documents produced or given in evidence. It permits a court, after such preliminary inquiry as it considers necessary, to record a finding and make a written complaint to a competent Magistrate where the statutory requirements are satisfied.

But again, there is a line that journalism must not cross:

An application under Section 379 is not a judicial finding of perjury.

It is an application asking the court to consider whether the statutory process should be initiated.

The distinction is fundamental.

And this is where the Saket cases enter the picture

The documents supplied show two separate criminal/miscellaneous proceedings involving Nikhil Subramaniam and Ankiti Bose:

MC No. 1583/2025

CNR DLSE020191842025, reflecting proceedings under Section 379 BNSS, with the e-Courts record showing hearings extending through 27 August 2026 and a next date of 24 October 2026.

MC No. 1584/2025

CNR DLSE020191822025, also under Section 379 BNSS, also showing 24 October 2026 as the next hearing.

The corresponding orders dated 22 April 2025 record applications under Section 340 CrPC / Section 379 BNSS concerning alleged false statements by the complainant.

That is a fact.

What is not established by those docket sheets is that Bose actually committed perjury.

The cases demonstrate that applications alleging false statements were brought against her and that the proceedings continued.

That is a significant fact in itself—but it should not be inflated into a conviction that the court has not issued.

There is also a longer litigation history

The current litigation is not the first time Bose has sought judicial restrictions concerning publications connected with the Zilingo controversy.

In 2023, the Bombay High Court dealt with Suit No. 242 of 2023, Ankiti Bose v. Mahesh Murthy & Anr. In its 24 August 2023 order, the Court granted interim relief concerning an Outlook Business article.

But the history is not uniformly one-directional.

In another Bombay proceeding involving Bose and Nikhil Subramaniam, the High Court in October 2023 dealt with objections concerning inconsistencies between pleadings and assertions in a leave petition, ultimately returning the plaint for presentation before the appropriate court. Contemporary legal reporting of that judgment specifically notes the Court’s concern over variance between the plaint and the leave petition.

This is relevant as procedural history, not as proof of a propensity to commit perjury.

That distinction matters.

The Zilingo controversy itself remains contested

Any serious investigative article about Bose must also avoid rewriting the Zilingo controversy as a proven criminal conviction.

Zilingo announced in May 2022 that Bose had been terminated after an independent forensic investigation into complaints of serious financial irregularities and said it reserved the right to pursue appropriate legal action.

Bose disputed the circumstances of her termination and said she had been terminated for reasons including “insubordination” and that she had not been given a proper opportunity to address the concerns.

Mint subsequently reported that the termination letter contained several grounds, including insubordination, neglect and failure to produce documents, while not accusing her of fraudulent transactions in the termination letter itself.

That makes one thing clear:

There are allegations and competing accounts, but the public material does not permit a newspaper to present those disputed corporate allegations as a criminal conviction.

So what exactly is the mystery?

The mystery is not that Bose approached the High Court.

A litigant can legally bring proceedings in a different forum when jurisdiction and cause-of-action requirements are satisfied.

The mystery is the sequence.

A plaintiff receives interim relief in Dwarka.

The defendant raises foundational objections under Order VII Rule 11.

The court scrutinises the physical plaint and records that it appears to be a scanned copy.

The court orders production of the original.

The court orders an affidavit addressing nationality/citizenship.

The defendant continues to raise compliance on 25 August.

Yet a new High Court proceeding emerges on 24 August concerning subsequent publications.

And the available documents do not presently show a formal order withdrawing the Dwarka suit before the High Court action.

That is not a conclusion of wrongdoing.

It is a documentary sequence demanding explanation.

The most serious allegations remain allegations—not findings

There is an understandable temptation to connect the dots and declare:

“The Dwarka plaint was forged, therefore Bose abandoned it and manufactured a new version in the High Court.”

The present record does not permit that statement to be made as established fact.

What the record actually permits us to say is substantially more precise:

1. A challenge was made to the authenticity/form of the pleadings and affidavits.
2. The Dwarka Court itself found upon scrutiny that the physical plaint appeared to be a scanned copy.
3. The Court ordered production of the original.
4. The Court ordered a citizenship/nationality affidavit and expressly preserved possible consequences if a false claim were subsequently established.
5. A separate Section 379 BNSS application was filed raising allegations concerning documents/statements in the proceedings.
6. Two separate Section 379 BNSS proceedings involving Bose are reflected in the Saket e-Courts material.
7. The Dwarka matter remained active at least on 25 August, with compliance still being addressed and the matter fixed for 9 October.
8. A separate Delhi High Court action was instituted on 24 August and interim restrictions were granted concerning specified subsequent publications.

Those are the facts.

The inference that the High Court case was filed specifically to escape scrutiny in Dwarka remains an inference unless documentary evidence establishes that purpose.

The question that now matters most

The central issue is therefore not whether Ankiti Bose was entitled to approach a High Court.

The central issue is this:

Why did the litigation move from a court that had already granted her interim protection to another court at precisely the point when the original proceeding contained outstanding directions concerning the original plaint and affidavits?

That question is legitimate.

And it becomes sharper because the High Court’s 24 August order itself acknowledges the earlier Dwarka proceeding.

The answer could be entirely procedural.

It could be a new cause of action.

It could involve later publications.

It could involve different defendants or jurisdictional considerations.

It could be the result of legal strategy.

Or there may be additional orders and documents not presently visible in the public record.

But the explanation needs to come from the record, not from speculation.

A courtroom is not a place for two versions of the same document

The most important unanswered documentary question remains brutally simple:

Where is the original plaint?

Not the scanned copy.

Not the e-file.

Not a photocopy.

Not a digitally reproduced signature.

The original directed to be produced by the Dwarka Court.

Because the court itself specifically directed its production and warned of consequences for non-compliance.

And if that original exists and was subsequently produced, there should be a clear record of when it was produced and what the court did with it.

If it does not exist, that too becomes a matter requiring explanation.

That is not journalism being “attacking.”

That is basic documentary accountability.

The perjury question cannot simply be wished away

There are now documented judicial proceedings in which allegations concerning false statements/documents have been placed before courts in connection with Bose.

There is the Section 379 application in the Dwarka litigation.

There are two separate Section 379 matters reflected in the Saket e-Courts records.

And there are earlier proceedings where courts have examined pleading inconsistencies and procedural objections involving Bose.

But none of that by itself proves perjury.

The next legal question is precisely the one contemplated by Section 379 BNSS:

Will a competent court, after the necessary preliminary scrutiny, find that an inquiry/complaint in relation to an offence affecting the administration of justice is warranted?

Until that happens, the words “perjury,” “forgery,” “fabricated affidavit” and “false document” must remain allegations unless and until judicially established.

That makes the story more—not less—powerful.

Because the unanswered questions are already substantial without inventing a verdict.

The final question for Ankiti Bose is therefore not whether she had the right to approach the Delhi High Court

She plainly had access to the legal process.

The question is whether the procedural transition is fully explainable from the court record.

Why was the second proceeding necessary?

What precisely was the relationship between the Dwarka and High Court suits?

Was the Dwarka case ever formally withdrawn, and if so, when and by what order?

What happened to the original plaint after the 6 August direction?

Was the original affidavit produced?

What explanation was filed concerning citizenship?

Why were Section 379 proceedings necessary in relation to the underlying litigation?

Why do two separate Section 379 proceedings involving Bose appear in the Saket record?

And, most importantly:

Do the documents eventually filed by Bose reconcile every discrepancy identified by the courts, or do they create further questions?

Those are not questions that Inventiva—or any newspaper—should answer by assertion.

They should be answered by orders, original documents, filing records and judicial findings.

And that is precisely why this story is not finished.

The courts have already put several pieces of the documentary puzzle on the table. The remaining task is to establish what happened to the missing pieces.

Editorial note: This article deliberately distinguishes verified court-record facts from allegations raised in applications and from investigative questions. The available documents do not establish that Ankiti Bose has committed perjury or forgery; any such finding would require the competent court to make it.