How Godrej Properties, Canara Bank & Madan Couple Roop Kishore Madan & Bela Madan Running A Multi Crore Real Estate Scam In Gurugram

In the opaque corridors of Delhi-NCR real estate finance, a set of serious allegations has circulated with unusual intensity since mid-August 2026. At the centre stand Roop Kishore Madan (DIN 00656697) and Bela Madan (DIN 00656730), directors of Magic Info Solutions Private Limited and a sprawling network of companies operating primarily under the Sanya banner. The claims, detailed extensively in a series of reports by Inventiva, describe a sophisticated financing arrangement that allegedly converts individuals with strong credit scores into temporary vehicles for low-cost bank capital, while the ultimate economic benefit accrues to the promoters and their related entities.

These remain allegations circulating in media and public discourse. They have not, as of the latest publicly available records, crystallised into charge-sheets, convictions, or confirmed findings by the CBI, Enforcement Directorate, or courts specifically against the Madans on the precise model described. What follows is a structured examination of the four dimensions requested, grounded in verified corporate records, insolvency proceedings, regulatory orders, and the broader Supreme Court-monitored investigation into builder-bank subvention schemes.

1. The Exact Scheme Alleged Against the Madan Couple

According to the circulating accounts, the arrangement operates as a multi-layered arbitrage of credit risk, interest rates, and documentation:

Individuals with high CIBIL scores are approached with the promise of a modest, relatively risk-free return (commonly cited as 4–5 per cent on the transaction value). A small down payment is transferred to the individual, who then routes an equivalent or related sum back to a company controlled by the Madans through formal banking channels. This creates the appearance of a genuine buyer contribution.

A tripartite agreement is then executed among the individual (as “homebuyer”), the developer entity linked to the Madans, and a bank. The bank sanctions a home loan at retail rates (historically in the 6.5–7.5 per cent range for housing finance) rather than the significantly higher rates applicable to commercial or builder funding (often 18–22 per cent or more). Because the loan is in the name of a creditworthy individual, due diligence is allegedly lighter than for a pure developer loan.

The Madans or their entities are said to service the pre-EMIs (or EMIs) for a period, while the underlying property remains under their effective control. At a later stage the property is sold to a genuine end-buyer, generating a profit that is allegedly routed through other group companies. In some described worst-case variants, EMI payments stop, leaving the original individual with a damaged credit score and outstanding liability while the promoters retain the economic upside.

The alleged economic logic is straightforward: obtain bank money at cheap retail rates by interposing clean credit profiles, avoid the higher cost and stricter scrutiny of commercial borrowing, and recycle the capital through related entities. The circulating descriptions characterise this as systematic money siphoning and, in extreme cases, credit-score destruction for the recruited individuals.

Public corporate records confirm that Roop Kishore Madan and Bela Madan control an extensive web of companies spanning real estate, infrastructure, hospitality, automobiles, and other sectors. Magic Info Solutions itself has a documented history of insolvency proceedings. Whether the specific multi-party credit-arbitrage model operates as alleged remains unproven in the public domain and would require forensic examination of loan files, tripartite agreements, fund flows, and EMI payment trails.

2. Connection with Canara Bank and Godrej

The documented corporate link runs through the Godrej Summit project in Sector 104, Gurugram. Magic Info Solutions held the land and development rights; Godrej Premium Builders (a Godrej Properties subsidiary) was the joint-development partner responsible for construction and marketing. Allotment letters and payments in the early 2010s involved both entities. When homebuyers later sought refunds for delayed or incomplete possession, the National Company Law Tribunal admitted insolvency petitions against Magic Info Solutions in September 2019 and initiated the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. Subsequent Haryana RERA and National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission orders have also addressed refund and deficiency claims linked to the project or related Godrej entities.

The Inventiva reports specifically name Canara Bank as one of the lenders that allegedly sanctioned loans under the described tripartite structure. No independent public record has emerged confirming that Canara Bank systematically participated in the precise credit-arbitrage model attributed to the Madans. Canara Bank, like other public-sector banks, has extensive home-loan operations and has appeared in other subvention-related insolvency litigation (for example, asserting financial-creditor status on the basis of tripartite agreements with different developers). Any specific role in the alleged Madan arrangements would require examination of individual loan accounts and sanction files.

Godrej Properties’ involvement is therefore limited, on the public record, to the joint-development partnership on Godrej Summit and the subsequent legal fallout when Magic Info Solutions entered insolvency. The broader allegations of ongoing collaboration in a subvention arbitrage scheme remain media-reported claims rather than adjudicated findings.

3. Past Allegations and Controversies Involving Godrej Properties

Godrej Properties is one of India’s largest listed real-estate developers and benefits from the broader Godrej Group’s reputation. It is not immune to the sector’s endemic problems. Regulatory and judicial records show a recurring pattern of homebuyer complaints, primarily around delivery timelines, refunds on cancellation, and amenity shortfalls:

• Multiple MahaRERA and other state RERA orders have directed refunds of booking amounts, sometimes with interest, in projects across Mumbai, Thane, and elsewhere. In one pre-RERA project the regulator ordered return of the full booking amount after an early cancellation; in others the company was directed to refund substantial advances after buyers withdrew.
• National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission orders have found deficiency in service, including failure to deliver promised infrastructure (for example, a 24-metre road link at Godrej Summit years after offer of possession) and ordered multi-crore refunds.
• Delivery data analysed by independent trackers shows on-time or near-on-time completion in a minority of projects; significant delays of 6–36 months appear in a material percentage. Severe stalling is less common than with many peers but not absent.
• In Gujarat, Godrej itself filed a complaint alleging misappropriation of funds by a joint-venture partner on a project (Godrej Garden City / Celeste), leading to an EOW FIR. Structural issues later required demolition and reconstruction of certain buildings.
• An Enforcement Directorate inquiry linked to a complaint by a former joint-venture partner (ORRIS) was publicly denied by Godrej as baseless and arising from a commercial dispute; earlier CBI and EOW probes had reportedly found no wrongdoing by the company.
• Advertising and RERA-registration violations have attracted modest penalties in isolated cases.

These issues are serious for the affected homebuyers and reflect systemic pressures in the Indian real-estate sector—aggressive sales, construction-linked payment plans, and occasional shortfalls in execution. They do not, on the public record, establish a pattern of the specific credit-arbitrage scheme alleged against the Madans. Godrej’s scale, listed status, and institutional scrutiny make large-scale undetected fraud more difficult than for smaller private entities, but regulatory interventions demonstrate that buyer grievances continue.

4. Past Allegations and Controversies Involving Roop Kishore Madan and Bela Madan

The Madans’ corporate footprint is extensive and long-standing. Roop Kishore Madan appears as director or designated partner in roughly two dozen active companies and LLPs spanning real estate, hospitality (including Sanya Hospitality, owner-operator of Courtyard by Marriott Gurugram Downtown), automobiles, energy, and other sectors. Bela Madan is co-director in many of the same entities.

Documented legal and regulatory history includes:

• Insolvency of Magic Info Solutions (2019): NCLT admitted homebuyer petitions seeking refunds with interest on units in Godrej Summit and initiated CIRP. Physical possession disputes and termination notices formed the core of the claims. Later Haryana RERA orders have also directed refunds against Magic Info in related matters.
• Consumer litigation: A 2013 Goa State Consumer Commission case (Advocate Krishnendu Mukherjee v. Roop Kishore Madan & others) involved allegations of delayed possession of a villa, unilateral price escalation, and failure to hand over the property. The complainants sought possession, compensation, or refund of approximately ₹64.5 lakh.
• Older criminal proceedings: In 2000 the Delhi High Court considered an anticipatory-bail petition by Roop Kishore Madan in connection with an FIR under Section 306 IPC arising from a suicide note that named him. The petition was heard; available records do not show a subsequent conviction on those charges.
• Income-tax appellate proceedings have also involved Roop Kishore Madan in connection with write-offs of advances in earlier proprietary business activities.
• Corporate filings show a dense interlocking of companies under the Sanya umbrella, a structure that, while not illegal in itself, creates complexity for tracing fund flows—an issue frequently raised in real-estate investigations.

The builder-subvention model is not inherently illegal. When properly structured and when the developer fulfils its obligation to service interest until possession, it can ease the initial burden on genuine homebuyers. The Supreme Court has, however, repeatedly recognised that the model is highly susceptible to abuse: funds are disbursed early to developers, projects stall, pre-EMIs stop, and buyers are left with both the loan liability and an incomplete asset. The Court has directed the CBI to investigate systemic collusion between certain builders and banks; dozens of FIRs have been registered, charge-sheets filed in a subset of cases, and the Enforcement Directorate has been brought into the fold on proceeds-of-crime aspects.

Against this backdrop, the allegations against the Madans describe a particularly refined variant—using third-party credit profiles as disposable conduits for cheap capital. If substantiated, such a scheme would engage offences of cheating, criminal conspiracy, bank fraud, and potentially money laundering. The documented history of Magic Info Solutions’ insolvency, the dense corporate network, and the existence of past consumer and possession disputes supply circumstantial context that makes independent forensic scrutiny warranted.

At the same time, media allegations, however detailed, are not judicial findings. Banks, the CBI (already seized of the broader subvention investigation under Supreme Court monitoring), the Enforcement Directorate, and RERA authorities possess the statutory powers and access to loan files, account statements, and property records necessary to determine whether the described model has operated and at what scale.

Until those institutions act on concrete evidence, the claims remain serious but unproven. Homebuyers and individuals who believe they have been drawn into such arrangements retain the right—and in many cases the urgent necessity—to approach the competent authorities with their documentation. The public interest lies not in trial by circulating narrative, but in transparent, evidence-based investigation that either clears the names involved or holds accountable those who have systematically exploited the gap between retail housing finance and the realities of developer funding.