Why Krishan Rattan Have Deep Connections With People Whose Names Are Involved In Panama And Paradise Papers?
Krishan Rattan’s public profile is built around investment banking, alternative assets, entrepreneurship and billions of dollars in transactions. Yet the corporate trail around him raises a different set of questions. His professional associations have included people whose names appear in the ICIJ Offshore Leaks Database, including Ajoy Veer Kapoor in the Panama Papers and Rahul “Sonny” Lulla in the Paradise Papers. Shailesh Haribhakti, meanwhile, appears in Paradise Papers records and today holds a senior position at Terra-Invest. None of these associations, individually, establishes wrongdoing. But when offshore records, distressed companies, litigation and recurring corporate relationships intersect, should investors demand a closer explanation of the network?
From Panama Papers to Paradise Papers: Why Do Krishan Rattan’s Business Connections Keep Raising Questions?
There is a particular problem with polished investment biographies: they tend to describe the person, but rarely the network around the person.
Krishan Rattan’s public biography is certainly impressive. Terra-Invest describes Krishan Rattan as a founding partner and says he has raised, deployed and overseen transactions worth more than US$12 billion. Before Terra-Invest, the firm says, he founded Mount-Row, an alternative asset manager with more than US$1.2 billion in assets under management. His career includes senior positions at Société Générale, Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse.
But an investment professional is not judged only by his resume. He is also judged by the people with whom he chooses to build companies, investment platforms and advisory relationships. And that is where the Rattan story becomes considerably more complicated. The question is not whether every person who has ever crossed paths with Krishan Rattan has done anything wrong. The public record does not establish such a conclusion. The more relevant question is narrower — and considerably harder to dismiss:
Why does Rattan’s professional network repeatedly intersect with people, companies and episodes involving offshore structures, corporate distress, litigation and contested business histories?
That question becomes particularly relevant when the names involved are not merely acquaintances but business partners, directors, advisers or people occupying positions around Rattan’s investment platforms.
Terra-Invest itself currently identifies Rattan as a founding partner and Shailesh Haribhakti as its “Mentor-In-Chief.” Meanwhile, historical corporate records connect Rattan with Rahul “Sonny” Lulla at Distribution Logistics Infrastructure, or DLI, while Ajoy Veer Kapoor was publicly identified as part of the founding team of Augustya alongside Rattan. Then there are the offshore records, of all these three men. And this is where the story deserves much closer examination.
The Panama Papers connection: Ajoy Veer Kapoor and Augustya
The first offshore connection, we describe in Rattan’s earlier business history runs through Ajoy Veer Kapoor. This is not merely a case of two people appearing in the same broad financial ecosystem.
In 2020, Australian-listed KNeoMedia announced an exclusive licensing arrangement involving Augustya for the Indian market. Public material identified the Augustya founding team as Krishan Rattan, Ajoy Veer Kapoor and Vasavi Vittal. That makes Kapoor’s background directly relevant to the examination of Rattan’s network.
The ICIJ Offshore Leaks Database identifies Ajoy Veer Kapoor as a beneficiary of YASU MANAGEMENT LIMITED, a British Virgin Islands entity incorporated on February 3, 2006. The record forms part of the Panama Papers dataset and associates Kapoor with the United Arab Emirates.
The Panama Papers record does not say that Kapoor committed a crime. Nor does the existence of a BVI entity automatically establish tax evasion, money laundering or any other illegal conduct. Offshore companies can have legitimate commercial purposes.
But that is precisely why the question becomes one of transparency rather than accusation.
- What was the purpose of Yasu Management?
- What was Kapoor’s precise beneficial interest?
- What was the economic rationale for the structure?
- Was the structure disclosed to counterparties when Kapoor became involved with Augustya?

And, most importantly, did Krishan Rattan know about the offshore connection when he entered into business with Ajoy Veer Kapoor?
These are reasonable due-diligence questions.
The significance is amplified by Ajoy Veer Kapoor’s earlier professional association with the investment-management ecosystem around IL&FS. Reporting and corporate records have linked him to Saffron Asset Advisors and IIML Asset Advisors.
So the Augustya connection was not simply:
Rattan + Kapoor = one startup.
It was:
Rattan + Kapoor + a documented offshore database entry + a substantial earlier financial-services history.
That does not prove misconduct.
But it certainly makes the relationship more interesting than a conventional entrepreneurial partnership.
The Paradise Papers connection: Rahul “Sonny” Lulla and the DLI question
The second thread is potentially more complicated because it involves both an offshore database and a company that later entered insolvency proceedings.
The ICIJ Offshore Leaks Database identifies Rahul “Sonny” Lulla in the Paradise Papers dataset. According to ICIJ, Lulla was a director of two Cayman Islands entities: GGIC Greenbacker Funding Ltd. and King Tech Holdings Ltd.
Again, precision matters. The ICIJ record does not constitute a finding that Lulla committed an offence. But the connection becomes relevant because Lulla and Rattan were also connected through Distribution Logistics Infrastructure Private Limited, or DLI.
Corporate records identify both men as directors of DLI, with Rattan’s appointment recorded from April 2019. DLI subsequently entered the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process in May 2026. Public insolvency records and reporting put provisionally admitted secured financial-creditor claims at approximately ₹993 crore.
That is where the offshore connection stops being merely an offshore story.
It becomes a corporate-governance question.
- What happened to DLI?
- What decisions were made during Krishan Rattan’s period as director?
- What was the company’s financial position when he joined its board?
- What information was available to the directors?
- What did lenders know?
- Were restructuring options adequately explored?
And what exactly was the board’s response as the company’s financial position deteriorated?
Krishan Rattan’s position that he resigned in June 2025 is relevant and should be included in any fair account. The subsequent insolvency admission came in May 2026. That chronology means the insolvency itself cannot simply be attributed personally to Rattan. But a resignation before insolvency does not answer every question about the preceding years either.
That is why the DLI story deserves documentary scrutiny rather than easy conclusions.
The important point is the recurrence of the same professional name.
Rahul Lulla appears in the Paradise Papers. Rahul Lulla and Krishan Rattan appear together in DLI. DLI subsequently enters insolvency with close to ₹1,000 crore of provisionally admitted secured claims. None of those facts proves the next one. But together they create a network that investors would reasonably want explained.
Shailesh Haribhakti: the Paradise Papers name who is now inside Terra-Invest
Then comes perhaps the most striking present-day connection: Shailesh Haribhakti. Unlike Kapoor and Lulla, Haribhakti is not merely someone from an earlier venture. He is currently presented by Terra-Invest as its Mentor-in-Chief. Terra-Invest describes him as a veteran chartered and cost accountant, certified internal auditor, financial planner and fraud examiner. It also lists numerous board and governance roles. His name also appears in the Paradise Papers.

The ICIJ Offshore Leaks Database identifies Shailesh Haribhakti as a shareholder in Astonfield Renewable Resources Ltd. within the Paradise Papers data.
Contemporary reporting by The Indian Express in 2017 similarly reported Haribhakti’s name among Indians identified in the Paradise Papers. The report said registry data showed him as one of 36 shareholders in Astonfield Renewable Resources, holding 150 ordinary shares. It also reported his explanation that he had not personally registered a Malta entity and had been allotted a small number of shares in the holding company after being appointed adviser to a solar initiative in India; according to the report, he said he later resigned from the advisory role.
The issue is what the database entry represented, what the underlying commercial arrangement was, and why someone whose name appears in those records subsequently became a senior adviser within Krishan Rattan’s investment platform. There is also a broader compromised corporate-network connection of Krishan Rattan. Reporting identifies historical board overlap between Haribhakti and members of the Lulla family, including Rajiv Lulla at Blue Star.
Again, a board association is not evidence of a secret arrangement.
But consider the cumulative picture.
- Haribhakti appears in Paradise Papers records.
- Rahul Lulla appears in Paradise Papers records.
- Ajoy Veer Kapoor appears in Panama Papers records.
- Kapoor was a founding associate of Rattan’s Augustya.
- Lulla was a director alongside Rattan at DLI.
- Haribhakti is now Mentor-in-Chief at Terra-Invest.
At what point does an investment network become sufficiently interconnected that the people inside it deserve the same level of scrutiny as the transactions themselves? That is the question.
The earlier Rattan network: Voltaire and the Lulla family
The offshore records are only one layer. The earlier corporate relationships surrounding Krishan Rattan provide another.
Public reporting and company records have placed Rattan alongside members of the Lulla family in companies including Voltaire Advisory Services, Voltaire Securities and Deep Blue Advisors. Rajiv Ramesh Lulla and Rahul Lulla are brothers, according to reporting cited in the investigation into the network. The relevance of Voltaire is increased by the English litigation involving Rattan.
Claims were brought against Krishan Rattan in the Voltaire-related litigation, but the proceedings were ultimately discontinued by consent in August 2026. That procedural outcome must not be transformed into either a finding of guilt or a declaration that all allegations were false. There was no completed trial establishing the substantive allegations against Rattan.
Yet the litigation remains part of the documented chronology. So does DLI. So does Augustya. And so do the offshore database records. The investigative question therefore becomes less about any one company and more about Rattan’s pattern of professional association. And when earlier companies encountered financial or legal problems, did those experiences influence subsequent due diligence?
These questions are particularly relevant because Krishan Rattan’s present investment identity is built around trust. Terra-Invest presents itself as a global investment firm working across capital, policy, technology, healthcare, energy and emerging markets.
An investment platform does not merely sell financial products. It sells judgment. And judgment includes deciding whom to trust.
Geoff Pollard: another layer in the network
The Krishan Rattan network also extends through Geoff Pollard, who has been associated with Mount Row and later with Telok Partners.

Here again, caution is essential.
The available New Zealand litigation record involving Krishan Rattan’s connection Geoff Pollard does not establish a criminal fraud conviction. The relevant proceedings were civil commercial litigation. A New Zealand High Court judgment contained adverse findings concerning funding representations and corporate record-keeping, while separate disputes involving the Fujairah terminal have remained contested.
That distinction is fundamental. A civil finding is not a criminal conviction. An allegation is not a finding. A disputed commercial transaction is not automatically evidence of fraud. But it is also true that sophisticated investors conduct background checks precisely because civil disputes, governance findings and disputed transactions can create reputational and commercial risks.
Pollard’s connection matters because the wider professional network also includes Rahul Lulla, who has subsequently been listed in a capital-advisory role at Telok Partners.
Once again, the question is not:
Does this prove wrongdoing?
It does not.
The more useful question is:
Why do these relationships continue to intersect?
And then there is the US$100 million litigation
Krishan Rattan’s own litigation history cannot simply be ignored while examining the people around him. The English Commercial Court proceedings involving Krishan Rattan included very substantial allegations and figures concerning an investment dispute. The claims were subsequently discontinued by consent in August 2026.
That procedural development matters enormously. A discontinued claim is not equivalent to a judicial finding against the defendant. But neither should the existence of the litigation be erased from a professional biography. For investors, the relevant question is often not merely whether someone ultimately won or lost a case.
It is:
- What happened?
- Who alleged what?
- What evidence was placed before the court?
- Why did the parties settle or discontinue?
- Was there any admission?
- What did the court actually decide?
Those distinctions are particularly important when assessing someone operating in private capital, where reputational credibility is itself an economic asset.
The real issue: coincidence or due diligence?
Perhaps the most tempting conclusion would be to string every name together and declare that they constitute one giant network of wrongdoing. The opposite extreme, dismissing every connection as coincidence, would be equally inadequate. The evidence supports something more precise.
- There are documented corporate relationships.
- There are documented offshore database entries.
- There are documented insolvency proceedings.
- There has been documented litigation.
- There are documented professional appointments.
And there are recurring names.
What the available evidence does not establish is that Krishan Rattan personally committed wrongdoing merely because people around him appear in those records.
But there is a legitimate investigative question hiding inside it.
How rigorous was the due diligence?
If Krishan Rattan was building investment platforms, did he conduct comprehensive background checks on prospective partners? If he knew of offshore structures, what did he understand their purpose to be? If someone had previously occupied senior positions at companies later associated with serious financial problems, how was that history assessed? If someone faced litigation, was that disclosed to investors and counterparties?
If a company in which Krishan Rattan served as director later entered insolvency, what did the board know before the collapse? And when individuals moved from one interconnected platform to another, who checked their previous histories? These are not accusations. They are the questions that serious capital markets are supposed to ask.
What the offshore records actually tell us
There is an important lesson in the Panama and Paradise Papers. An offshore database is not a criminal database. ICIJ itself describes its Offshore Leaks Database as a collection of information concerning offshore entities, foundations and trusts drawn from several major investigations. Its records cover hundreds of thousands of entities and individuals. Consequently, the mere appearance of a person’s name should never be turned into a declaration of criminality.
But the opposite mistake is possible too. A database entry can reveal something that conventional corporate biographies omit. It can reveal an offshore company.
- A beneficiary.
- A director.
- A shareholder.
- A jurisdiction.
- A corporate structure.
And once that person subsequently becomes a business partner, adviser or director alongside another investment professional, the information becomes relevant to due diligence. That is precisely why the Krishan Rattan network deserves examination.
The more sophisticated the investment platform, the higher the expectation of transparency should be.
Terra-Invest describes Rattan as an investor who has overseen billions of dollars of transactions. That scale creates an obvious expectation: the same level of rigour used to assess a US$100 million transaction should arguably be applied to the people who sit around the table.
Because ultimately, investment risk is not only about the asset. It is also about the people. And the Krishan Rattan story presents an unusually dense collection of people, companies, offshore records, corporate failures and litigation.
The evidence does not establish a conspiracy.
It does establish a network. And that network raises questions that cannot responsibly be answered by a glossy resume.
The central question therefore remains remarkably simple:
When Krishan Rattan builds an investment platform, who checks the people he builds it with, and what exactly do those checks reveal?



