Where The Money Went Is One Question. Who Was Around It Is Another: Robin Raina, Ankiti Bose, Krishan Rattan, Vikas Garg And The Ebix-Mahadev Trail

Some corporate stories remain neatly contained within the companies that created them. This one does not. It begins with Ebix, the global insurance and financial technology company built by Robin Raina, and its Indian subsidiary, EbixCash.

It passes through Zilingo, the once high-flying fashion-tech company founded by Ankiti Bose, which reportedly paid about $944,000 to EbixCash in 2021. It then reaches Krishan Rattan, the London-based investment professional who later became Bose’s business partner at Terra-Invest.

Then comes Vikas Garg.

After Ebix entered bankruptcy, Garg emerged as one of the businessmen behind the consortium that acquired the company in 2024. The acquisition would later become the subject of a far more serious investigation: the Enforcement Directorate alleged that proceeds generated through the illegal betting network associated with Mahadev Online Book and Skyexchange had been routed through entities connected to Garg and used in connection with the Ebix acquisition. Garg was arrested by the ED in July 2026.

That takes the story somewhere else entirely  –  to Saurabh Chandrakar and Ravi Uppal, whom the ED has identified as the principal promoters of the Mahadev betting network and who operated from Dubai. Another name, Dinesh Khambhat, appears in police allegations concerning an alleged match-fixing and betting network and has been described in reporting as London-based.

And London happens to be an important part of Rattan’s professional world.

Singapore appears too: it was central to Zilingo’s corporate history and has featured in the professional footprint of both Bose and Rattan. Dubai appears in the Mahadev investigation and in the international footprint of Bose and Rattan’s current business activities.

None of that, by itself, proves a connection. That distinction is important.

A shared city is not evidence of a shared business. A common nationality or place of origin is not evidence of a financial relationship. A commercial transaction is not evidence of criminal conduct. And an allegation by an investigating agency is not the same thing as a finding by a court.

But the opposite is also true.

When the same companies, people, transactions and jurisdictions begin appearing across different corporate stories, the right response is not to dismiss the overlaps simply because they are uncomfortable. It is to examine them.

Who actually knew whom? Which relationships are documented? Which companies were involved? Who owned them, advised them, financed them or represented them? What money moved between them? And where does the documentary trail stop?

The answers may ultimately reveal a meaningful network. They may reveal several unrelated stories occupying the same international financial ecosystem. Or they may show that some of the apparent connections are nothing more than coincidence.

This investigation does not begin by choosing among those explanations. It begins by putting the names on the table and following the evidence.

Robin Raina: The Man Who Built Ebix

Before Ebix became part of an Enforcement Directorate money-laundering investigation, it was the story of Robin Raina.

Raina built his career around insurance technology and financial services, eventually becoming the defining figure at Ebix. He joined the company in the late 1990s, rose to president and chief executive, and later became chairman. Under his leadership, Ebix expanded from its core insurance-software business into a much broader financial-services technology group, pursuing acquisitions across markets and building a substantial presence in India.

India became particularly important to that expansion. Ebix acquired a series of businesses in payments, travel, remittances, insurance and financial services, bringing them under the EbixCash umbrella. What began as an expansion strategy eventually turned EbixCash into one of the group’s most visible businesses outside the United States.

Raina was not merely a senior executive watching that expansion from a distance. He was the architect of the strategy. That matters because EbixCash is where a completely different corporate story – Zilingo –  eventually enters the picture.

But first, Ebix itself began running into trouble.

The company accumulated substantial debt and faced increasing financial pressure. In December 2023, Ebix filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States. The bankruptcy transformed the company from an acquisition-driven technology group into a distressed asset looking for a new owner.

And that is where the next chapter of Raina’s story becomes particularly significant.

The man who had spent decades building Ebix was no longer simply trying to run it. He was now involved in determining who would own it after bankruptcy.

In 2024, a consortium involving Eraaya Lifespaces, Vikas Lifecare and Vitasta Software India moved to acquire the reorganised Ebix businesses. Raina was involved in the acquisition process through Vitasta and, according to subsequent filings, had approached Vikas Garg to pursue the transaction.

The deal closed in August 2024.

For a brief period, the transition appeared to offer continuity: Raina remained associated with Ebix after the acquisition and took a position within the new ownership structure.

It did not last.

Within weeks, Eraaya suspended Raina and said it had received information concerning alleged financial irregularities involving Ebix and its subsidiaries. Raina disputed the allegations. What followed was a widening corporate and legal confrontation between Raina and the new owners, with both sides putting forward sharply different accounts of what had happened inside the company.

That dispute is important for another reason. It means the Ebix ownership story is not a simple line from Raina to Garg. The two men were, at least initially, on the same side of the transaction that brought Ebix out of bankruptcy.

Only later did their relationship fracture.

And while that battle was unfolding, another investigation was beginning to cast an entirely different light on the acquisition – one involving the Enforcement Directorate, alleged betting proceeds and the Mahadev Online Book network.

To understand why that matters, however, we first need to understand the company sitting between Raina’s Ebix empire and another name that will appear repeatedly in this story: EbixCash.

EbixCash: The Door Into The Story

EbixCash was not an incidental subsidiary sitting somewhere at the edge of Raina’s empire. It was one of the most important pieces of Ebix’s India strategy.

Through acquisitions and expansion, the business built operations across payments, remittances, travel, financial services and related technology. The logic was straightforward: instead of remaining a software company serving insurers and financial institutions, Ebix wanted to own and operate parts of the financial-services infrastructure itself.

EbixCash became the vehicle for that ambition. It also created an unusual intersection between two companies that, on the surface, had little in common.

One was Ebix, a US-listed insurance and financial-technology group led by Raina. The other was Zilingo, a Singapore-based fashion and commerce startup founded by Ankiti Bose and Dhruv Kapoor.

The connection was not ownership. It was money.

According to reporting by Inc42, Zilingo paid approximately US$944,000 to EbixCash between August and September 2021. The payments were reportedly connected to technology and IT services.

The amount is significant enough to warrant attention, but the number alone is not the story. The questions arise from the circumstances surrounding the transaction.

Inc42 reported that a contract relating to the services was signed in September 2021 but that documentation indicated an earlier date. The publication also raised questions about the nature of the services and the payments made under the arrangement. These were reported concerns arising from its investigation into Zilingo’s finances; they were not a judicial finding that the transaction itself was fraudulent.

That distinction matters because the Zilingo story subsequently became deeply contentious.

Zilingo, once one of Southeast Asia’s most celebrated startups, would collapse into a bitter dispute over its finances and management. Bose was suspended and later removed as CEO following an investigation into alleged financial irregularities. She disputed the allegations and challenged the process surrounding her removal.

But the EbixCash transaction predates that collapse. At the time, Zilingo was still operating as a high-growth technology company, while EbixCash was expanding its own technology and financial-services operations.

So the immediate question is a relatively simple one: What exactly was Zilingo buying from EbixCash for nearly a million dollars?

The answer matters not because a payment between two companies is inherently suspicious. Companies pay one another every day for legitimate services.

It matters because this particular payment sits at the intersection of two corporate histories that later took very different turns – one involving the collapse of Zilingo and the controversies surrounding Bose, and the other involving the bankruptcy of Ebix, its acquisition by a consortium involving Vikas Garg, and the subsequent ED investigation into the alleged movement of betting proceeds.

At this stage, however, the evidence establishes only the commercial transaction.

The larger questions come later.

First, it is necessary to understand the woman on the other side of that payment – and the corporate story that made Ankiti Bose one of the most closely watched startup founders in Asia.

Ankiti Bose: From Zilingo’s Rise To Its Collapse

Ankiti Bose’s story is difficult to separate from the extraordinary rise and equally dramatic collapse of Zilingo.

Bose co-founded the Singapore-headquartered fashion-commerce company in 2015 with Dhruv Kapoor. Zilingo expanded rapidly across Southeast Asia, attracted major international investors and became one of the region’s better-known startup success stories. Bose, meanwhile, became one of the most prominent young founders in the Asian technology ecosystem.

The company’s growth eventually brought much larger financial ambitions with it. But behind the headline valuation and expansion was a business whose finances would later come under intense scrutiny.

In early 2022, Zilingo suspended Bose following allegations concerning financial irregularities. She was subsequently removed as chief executive. Reports around the investigation referred to questions over the company’s finances, accounting and transactions involving various parties. Bose denied wrongdoing and disputed both the allegations and the manner in which the investigation was conducted.

The dispute quickly became much larger than a boardroom disagreement.

Bose maintained that the investigation into her conduct was flawed and that the allegations against her were being used to force her out. Zilingo’s investors and board, on the other hand, maintained that serious concerns had emerged that required investigation.

The competing accounts have never been neatly reconciled.

That matters when examining the approximately US$944,000 paid by Zilingo to EbixCash in 2021. The payment took place before Bose’s removal and became part of the wider questions raised in subsequent reporting about Zilingo’s financial transactions.

But the chronology does not establish that the EbixCash payment was improper.

It establishes something narrower: a substantial payment was made by Zilingo to a company belonging to the Ebix group, and later reporting raised questions about the underlying arrangement.

Then came another chapter.

In 2024, Bose filed a police complaint in Mumbai against former Zilingo executives Dhruv Kapoor and Aadi Vaidya, alleging sexual harassment, stalking, intimidation, cheating and other offences. The allegations were denied by those accused.

The timing became an issue in itself.

Bose had left Zilingo almost two years earlier, and the company was headquartered in Singapore, where much of the underlying corporate dispute had unfolded. Bose subsequently explained that she had been based in Singapore and had taken up a new job there, among other reasons why she did not travel to India earlier to file the complaint.

That leaves a legitimate investigative question – why Mumbai, and why then?

But the question should not be confused with an accusation. The choice of jurisdiction and timing deserve examination; they do not, by themselves, invalidate Bose’s allegations.

The legal and corporate disputes surrounding Zilingo continued beyond the original investigation. Subsequent proceedings have included tax-related allegations and litigation in India, with Bose continuing to dispute allegations of wrongdoing and maintaining that there has been no judicial finding establishing her guilt.

For the purposes of this investigation, however, another development is just as important as the controversies surrounding Zilingo.

Bose did not disappear from the financial world after Zilingo. She re-emerged as an investor and entrepreneur.

She became a founding partner of Terra-Invest, alongside Krishan Rattan and others, and became involved in investment and financial ventures including Kairoswealth. The firm’s stated interests span areas including technology, finance, healthcare, energy transition and emerging markets, with an international footprint extending across London, Dubai, Singapore and other financial centres.

That brings another name into the story.

Krishan Rattan is not simply a person who happens to appear alongside Bose in a corporate directory. He has his own long financial career, his own companies, his own controversies and his own litigation history.

And that history needs to be examined separately – before the two are placed back into the same picture.

Krishan Rattan: The Banker Behind The New Chapter

If Ankiti Bose’s career began in the startup world, Krishan Rattan came from an entirely different part of the financial system.

Rattan built his career in investment banking and alternative capital, working across some of the world’s largest financial institutions, including Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse and Société Générale. At Société Générale, he rose to Managing Director and Global Head of Alternative Capital Solutions.

This was not a career built around the startup ecosystem. It was built around capital – how it is raised, structured, deployed and moved across businesses and markets.

Rattan later moved into entrepreneurship and alternative investments, including the establishment of Mount-Row. His professional career has also had a substantial London component, a detail that becomes relevant later because London is separately mentioned in the Mahadev investigation through another name.

But before that coincidence is examined, there is another chapter that needs to be put on the record.

Voltaire.

Rattan became involved with the business and was subsequently named as a defendant in litigation in which claims of roughly US$100 million were made. The proceedings contained serious allegations concerning the ownership, control and dealings surrounding the business and its counterparties.

Those were allegations made in legal proceedings, not findings that Rattan had committed fraud or other wrongdoing.

Rattan contested the claims.

And there is an important update to the story that cannot be omitted from any current account of his history: in August 2026, the claims against Rattan were discontinued following a resolution, bringing that particular litigation to an end as against him.

That distinction is important.

An investigative account should record that Rattan was named in the proceedings and explain what was alleged. It must also record what happened afterwards.

The Voltaire episode therefore belongs in the record as part of Rattan’s business and litigation history – but it cannot be presented today as though those claims remain unresolved in their original form.

Rattan’s next major chapter brought him into a very different orbit. He became associated with Ankiti Bose.

The two eventually emerged together as founding partners of Terra-Invest, an investment platform with an international footprint. They also became associated with Kairoswealth, which Terra-Invest describes as a venture co-conceptualised by Bose, Rattan and Vincent Teyssier.

This is a documented business relationship.

It is also the point at which the paths of two people with very different professional histories begin running alongside each other.

Bose came from Zilingo – a company that had attracted enormous attention before collapsing into a highly contentious financial and management dispute.

Rattan came from institutional finance, alternative capital and a history that included the Voltaire litigation.

Now they were building an investment business together.

Terra-Invest’s stated footprint is international, with offices or operations spanning financial centres including London, Dubai and Singapore. Those locations will become increasingly relevant as this investigation moves forward.

But again, geography must not be mistaken for evidence.

Rattan’s presence in London does not connect him to every London-based individual who appears elsewhere in this story. A Singapore presence does not establish a relationship with every company operating there. And a Dubai office does not establish involvement in the Mahadev network.

Those are precisely the assumptions this investigation needs to test rather than make.

For now, one thing is clear: Bose and Rattan are genuine business partners.

And that makes Rattan relevant to the investigation for a straightforward reason — not because of an assumed connection to Mahadev, but because his business relationship with Bose is real, his own corporate history is substantial, and his professional footprint overlaps with some of the same international financial centres that appear elsewhere in the story.

The next question is therefore not whether Rattan and Bose know each other.

They do. The question is what else, if anything, sits behind the companies, transactions and jurisdictions that surround them.

Vikas Garg: The Buyer Who Later Entered The ED’s Crosshairs

Vikas Garg entered the Ebix story as a businessman looking for an acquisition.

He was associated with a group of companies including Vikas Lifecare, Vikas Ecotech and Eraaya Lifespaces, and had built his business interests across sectors ranging from manufacturing and infrastructure-related businesses to investments and acquisitions.

But his relevance to this investigation begins in 2024, when Ebix was no longer the company Robin Raina had spent decades building.

It was a bankrupt company looking for a buyer.

Ebix had filed for Chapter 11 protection in the United States in December 2023. The bankruptcy process opened the door for competing bidders to acquire the reorganised business.

Garg’s side entered that process through a consortium involving Eraaya Lifespaces, Vikas Lifecare and Vitasta Software India. And there was an important feature to the transaction that is easy to miss when the story is told backwards.

Raina and Garg were initially on the same side.

According to subsequent corporate filings, Garg approached Raina after Ebix entered bankruptcy, and the two agreed to pursue the acquisition together. Garg’s companies represented one side of the consortium, while Raina and Vitasta represented the other.

The acquisition was ultimately completed in August 2024.

For Garg, this was a major corporate transaction. For Raina, it offered a route for the company he had built to emerge from bankruptcy under new ownership while allowing him to remain involved.

But the relationship did not survive the transition.

Within weeks of the acquisition, Eraaya suspended Raina after saying it had received information concerning alleged financial irregularities involving Ebix and its subsidiaries. Raina disputed the allegations.

The corporate dispute that followed became increasingly bitter, with litigation and competing claims over control, documents, governance and the circumstances surrounding the company’s affairs.

That history matters because it provides the first documented bridge between two otherwise separate parts of this investigation. Raina and Garg were not connected merely because Garg eventually bought Ebix. They worked together to acquire it.

The story then took a far more serious turn.

In 2026, the Enforcement Directorate began examining Garg and companies linked to him in connection with its investigation into the Mahadev Online Book money-laundering network.

On July 14, 2026, the ED arrested Garg in the Mahadev-linked money-laundering case.

The agency subsequently alleged that proceeds generated through illegal betting operations had been routed through a network of entities and used in connection with Garg’s business interests and the acquisition of Ebix. The ED also provisionally attached assets and shareholdings linked to the transactions.

The scale of the allegation was substantial.

The ED said it had attached assets worth approximately ₹940.77 crore, including Eraaya’s shareholding in Ebix and immovable property. It alleged that hundreds of crores of rupees in proceeds of crime had been moved through overseas entities and financial instruments before being deployed into Garg-linked structures.

These are allegations by the investigating agency.

They are not a judicial determination that Garg is guilty.

That distinction becomes particularly important here because the allegations concern financial structures spanning multiple companies, jurisdictions and investment instruments. Establishing the source of money is one question. Establishing the knowledge and intent of the individuals involved is another.

The ED’s case therefore creates a new investigative question around the Ebix acquisition:

• Was the money used to acquire Ebix connected to the alleged betting-proceeds network?
• And if so, what did the participants in the acquisition know about the source of those funds?
• Those questions cannot be answered merely by pointing to the fact that Garg was arrested.
• They require the underlying money trail, transaction records, corporate filings and the ED’s specific allegations to be examined carefully.

There is another reason the chronology matters.

The acquisition took place in August 2024.

The ED action against Garg came nearly two years later.

Between those two points lies an entire corporate history – including the breakdown between Garg’s side and Raina, the restructuring of Ebix, and the development of investigations into Garg’s wider business interests.

So the picture is not: Raina → Garg → Mahadev. The documented sequence is more complicated. Raina and Garg came together to acquire a distressed Ebix.

They subsequently fell out.

Garg was later arrested in an investigation in which the ED alleged that betting proceeds had entered financial structures connected to his businesses.

Whether those events are merely adjacent chapters in a complicated corporate history or whether the financial trail reveals something deeper is precisely what needs to be established from the evidence.

And before that trail can be followed, the other side of the Mahadev story has to be understood.

Because at the centre of the ED’s investigation are two men whose names became synonymous with the betting syndicate itself: Saurabh Chandrakar and Ravi Uppal.

Saurabh Chandrakar And Ravi Uppal: The Men At The Centre Of Mahadev

Before the names of Ebix, Eraaya and Vikas Garg entered the Enforcement Directorate’s investigation, there was another business at the centre of the case: Mahadev Online Book.

The platform was described by the ED not as a single betting website, but as an umbrella network through which online betting operations were allegedly organised and monetised.

At the centre of that network, according to the agency, were Saurabh Chandrakar and Ravi Uppal, two businessmen from Bhilai, Chhattisgarh, who operated much of the alleged operation from Dubai.

The ED’s case describes a system built around betting websites, user IDs and panels.

The basic model was relatively simple.

Betting websites were allegedly operated through a network of panels and franchise arrangements. Users were brought into the system through these channels, while money generated from betting was moved through layers of bank accounts and other financial mechanisms designed, according to investigators, to conceal its origin.

The operation became far larger than an ordinary illegal betting website.

The ED has alleged the use of hawala channels, benami or dummy bank accounts, cryptocurrency and other forms of financial layering. According to the agency, a substantial portion of the proceeds remained with the principal promoters and was subsequently moved into different assets and businesses.

The scale of the investigation grew accordingly.

By March 2026, the ED said it had searched more than 175 premises, arrested 13 people and filed five prosecution complaints naming 74 accused. The agency put the total value of assets attached, seized or frozen in the investigation at approximately ₹4,336 crore.

Those figures describe the scale of the investigation, not a final determination of criminal liability.

But they explain why the Mahadev case has become important far beyond the world of online betting.

Once an illegal betting operation generates hundreds or thousands of crores, the central problem becomes what happens to the money afterwards.

• How is it moved?
• Who receives it?
• Which companies or individuals become the next layer?
• And, ultimately, where does it enter the legitimate economy?
• That is the question at the heart of the money-laundering investigation.

The ED alleges that Mahadev-linked proceeds were moved through complex structures and eventually found their way into assets and businesses in India and overseas.

It is within that broader allegation that Vikas Garg and the Ebix acquisition appear.

The agency has alleged that betting proceeds connected to the Mahadev/Skyexchange network were routed through entities linked to Garg and ultimately used in connection with the acquisition of Ebix.

That is a serious allegation.

But it is also a claim that must be kept in its proper legal place.

An ED attachment order is not a conviction. An arrest is not proof of guilt. And a company’s appearance in a money trail does not automatically establish that every executive, director, investor or former owner connected to that company knew the origin of the funds.

The evidence has to establish those links individually.

There is, however, another striking feature of the Mahadev investigation. The network was international.

Dubai became a major operating base. Money was allegedly moved across jurisdictions. Financial structures extended beyond India. And some of the names appearing in the wider allegations were based in other global financial centres.

Chandrakar and Uppal themselves remained outside India while the investigation progressed.

In July 2026, reporting citing investigators said Chandrakar had been traced to Oman and that India was seeking his extradition. The development followed years in which the ED had identified the two men as central figures in the alleged network.

The agency has also alleged that enormous sums were spent on Chandrakar’s 2023 wedding in Dubai and that assets connected to him were spread across jurisdictions.

Again, those allegations form part of an ongoing criminal investigation.

The significance for this investigation is narrower.

The Mahadev case establishes the money-laundering ecosystem that investigators say sits behind the later corporate allegations.

It gives us the source that the ED is trying to trace.

The next task is to understand the alleged route. Because the important question is not simply whether illegal betting money existed.

It is whether investigators can demonstrate a chain running from the alleged betting operations, through identifiable financial intermediaries and corporate structures, into specific assets or acquisitions.

That is where the Ebix transaction becomes relevant. But there is another name that appears in the Mahadev story before we get there.

A name based in London. Dinesh Khambat – or Khambhat, depending on the spelling used in the reporting.

And that name introduces yet another international city into an investigation that already runs through India, Dubai and Singapore.

Dinesh Khambat: The London Name In The Mahadev Case

The Mahadev investigation did not remain confined to betting platforms, bank accounts and Dubai-based promoters. Another name surfaced in a Mumbai police case: Dinesh Khambat, also reported in some publications as Dinesh Khambhat.

His significance comes from allegations contained in a police complaint concerning match-fixing and betting operations.

According to reporting on the FIR, the complainant alleged that Saurabh Chandrakar was operating through Khambat in London and another individual, Chander Aggarwal. The complaint described the two as being involved in the alleged match-fixing and operation of betting websites.

That is the allegation. It is important not to turn it into something it is not.

The FIR does not amount to a judicial finding that Khambat was a match-fixer. Nor does the mere appearance of his name in a police complaint establish that the allegations against him are true.

In fact, reporting at the time noted that the match-fixing aspect was distinct from the ED’s established money-laundering case, and investigators had not necessarily established the alleged match-fixing trail.

So why does the London connection matter here? Because London appears elsewhere in this investigation.

Krishan Rattan has a substantial professional history in London and is associated with Terra-Invest’s London presence. Rattan is also now a business partner of Ankiti Bose.

That creates a geographic overlap. 

But a geographic overlap is not a financial connection.

There is currently no established evidence showing that Rattan and Khambat are business partners, associates, counterparties or participants in the same transaction.

That distinction is critical.

Investigations can go badly wrong when geography is allowed to substitute for evidence. London is one of the world’s largest financial centres. Thousands of unrelated businesses, investors and professionals operate there. The fact that two names connected to entirely different investigations are associated with the city tells us very little by itself.

• The useful question is therefore not: Were both connected to London?
• It is: Is there a document, transaction, company, intermediary, address, adviser or other verifiable link connecting them?

That evidence has to be found or its absence has to be acknowledged. The same principle applies to the broader Mahadev story.

Chandrakar and Uppal’s Dubai operations, Khambat’s alleged London role and the later ED allegations concerning Garg’s companies create a picture spanning several jurisdictions.

But the picture only becomes meaningful if the individual lines can be substantiated.

For Khambat, the currently documented line is relatively narrow: a Mumbai FIR contained allegations concerning his alleged role in match-fixing and betting operations and described him as operating from London.

For Rattan, the documented line is different: an international financial career with a substantial London component and a current business relationship with Bose.

For Bose, the documented line leads back to Singapore, Zilingo and the later creation of Terra-Invest.

For Garg, the line leads from the Ebix acquisition to the ED’s allegations concerning Mahadev-linked proceeds.

These are four separate lines. There is, however, one place where the lines around Bose and Rattan genuinely do meet.

Singapore.

Singapore: Where Several Parts Of The Story Begin

Singapore is one of the most important locations in this investigation – not because every person in the story was there at the same time, but because several of the businesses at the centre of the story have a genuine connection to the city.

For Ankiti Bose, Singapore was central to her professional life.

Zilingo was headquartered there. It was from Singapore that the company built much of its Southeast Asian business and attracted international investors. Bose’s career as a founder, and the corporate dispute that eventually consumed Zilingo, were therefore deeply tied to the city.

The significance goes beyond geography.

Singapore was also the environment in which many of the decisions surrounding Zilingo’s finances and corporate governance were made. When the company’s board turned against Bose in 2022, the dispute unfolded against that Singapore corporate backdrop.

The EbixCash payment sits inside this chronology.

Zilingo made the approximately US$944,000 payment to EbixCash in 2021, while the company was still operating as a high-growth Singapore-based business.

Then, in 2022, the relationship between Bose and Zilingo’s board collapsed.

Later, Bose’s professional life moved in a different direction.

She eventually became associated with Terra-Invest, where Singapore is again listed among the firm’s international locations.

Krishan Rattan’s connection to Singapore comes through the same present-day business structure.

Terra-Invest lists both Bose and Rattan as founding partners and maintains a Singapore presence alongside offices in London, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Miami.

That establishes a corporate connection between Bose, Rattan and Singapore. 

This is particularly important in an investigation involving people who operate across multiple financial centres. Singapore, London and Dubai are not unusual locations for international investors, bankers and technology entrepreneurs.

The real question is whether the movements between those locations correspond with specific corporate events – consider the chronology.

The investigation now has three international centres appearing repeatedly:

Singapore. London. Dubai.

Singapore is tied to Zilingo and Bose, and is also a present-day Terra-Invest location.

London appears in Rattan’s professional history and in allegations concerning Dinesh Khambat in the Mahadev case.

Dubai appears in the ED’s account of Mahadev’s alleged operations and in Terra-Invest’s stated international footprint.

At first glance, that can look like an elaborate network.

But an international business operating across three major financial centres can produce exactly the same geographic pattern without any criminal connection whatsoever.

So the central investigative test becomes much harder — and much more useful.

• Do the people overlap, or only the cities?
• Do the companies overlap, or only the jurisdictions?
• Does the money overlap, or only the geography?

Those questions can be answered only by going beneath the public-facing corporate profiles.

Follow The Names, Not The Cities

Up to this point, the story has moved through Singapore, London and Dubai.

But cities are not connections. People are. Companies are. Money is.

And the first thing the documentary record tells us is that some of the relationships in this story are considerably stronger than others.

The strongest one is the relationship between Ankiti Bose and Krishan Rattan.

They are not simply two people who have appeared in the same financial centres. They are business partners. Terra-Invest identifies both as founding partners, while the firm’s own description says Bose co-conceptualised Kairoswealth with Rattan and Vincent Teyssier. Terra-Invest also maintains an international footprint that includes London, Dubai and Singapore.

That is a real corporate connection.

The second is the relationship between Robin Raina and Vikas Garg.

That connection is equally concrete, although entirely different in nature.

They came together during the acquisition of Ebix after its Chapter 11 filing. Corporate records show both were appointed to the board of the reorganised Ebix in June 2024, with Raina as chairman and Garg as vice-chairman.

Coincidence, Commerce Or Something More?

After putting the names, companies, transactions and jurisdictions side by side, the picture is undeniably unusual.

But unusual is not the same as incriminating. That distinction is the most important conclusion to emerge from the investigation.

There are genuine connections here.

1. Ankiti Bose’s former company, Zilingo, paid approximately US$944,000 to EbixCash in 2021. That transaction deserves scrutiny because questions were subsequently raised about the underlying technology arrangement and documentation.
2. Robin Raina and Vikas Garg were connected through the acquisition of Ebix after Ebix entered bankruptcy.
3. Bose and Krishan Rattan are genuine business partners through Terra-Invest and Kairoswealth.
4. Vikas Garg was later arrested by the Enforcement Directorate in the Mahadev-linked money-laundering investigation, with the agency alleging that betting proceeds were routed through entities connected to him and used in transactions involving his business interests.
5. Saurabh Chandrakar and Ravi Uppal are identified by the ED as central figures in the alleged Mahadev Online Book network.
6. Dinesh Khambat’s name appears in a Mumbai FIR containing allegations concerning betting and match-fixing, with London identified in connection with his alleged activities.

These are not invented links. They exist in corporate records, legal proceedings, police complaints, investigative-agency actions and published reporting. But the story becomes much less certain when those individual lines are joined together.

The story contains real intersections, but it does not yet contain one proven chain connecting all of them. That does not mean the questions disappear.

Quite the opposite. The questions become more precise.

Take the Zilingo–EbixCash transaction.

Nearly a million dollars moved between two corporate groups whose stories would later become highly contentious.

The Last Bit, The Uncanny Web But Is It Actually A Network?

There is a reason this story is compelling. The names keep returning. The companies keep changing hands. The same international financial centres appear repeatedly.

Money moves through corporate structures. People move between industries. And several of the individuals involved have already been at the centre of major corporate or legal controversies.

That combination naturally invites the question: Are we looking at a network?

The answer, at least from the evidence currently available, is more complicated.

There is unquestionably a network of business relationships.

Bose and Rattan are partners. Raina and Garg were acquisition partners. Zilingo and EbixCash were counterparties to a substantial payment. Garg and his companies are the subject of the ED’s Mahadev-linked allegations.

There is also a network of jurisdictions.

Singapore sits behind Zilingo and part of Bose’s career. London appears in Rattan’s professional history and in allegations concerning Khambat. Dubai appears in the ED’s account of the Mahadev operation and in Terra-Invest’s international footprint.

But business relationships and geography are not enough to establish a criminal network.

For that, the money has to connect. The entities have to connect. The people have to connect in a way that is supported by evidence. And that is precisely where the current picture remains incomplete.

Perhaps the missing evidence is buried in corporate records that have not yet been made public. Perhaps it exists in bank records or transaction documents accessible only to investigators. Perhaps the apparent connections are entirely unrelated.

Or perhaps further investigation will reveal intermediaries who sit quietly between the names already visible.

That is why the most important unanswered questions are remarkably straightforward. 

Did money move between the corporate structures?

Did the same beneficial owners appear behind supposedly unrelated entities?

Did the same advisers, intermediaries or investment vehicles repeatedly facilitate transactions between them?

Was anyone involved in the Ebix acquisition aware of the source of funds alleged by the ED?

What exactly was the nearly US$944,000 Zilingo payment to EbixCash for, and where did that money ultimately go?

Is there any documented relationship between Rattan and the London-based individual named in the Mahadev-related FIR?

Do Bose or Rattan appear anywhere in the financial or corporate records underlying the ED’s allegations against Garg?

Those questions are far more revealing than asking whether everyone has visited the same city. Because the real test of a network is not whether its members occupy the same map.

It is whether money, ownership, instructions and control cross from one part of the map to another.

The gaps are important because they determine whether this is ultimately a story about coincidence and commercial proximity or whether there is a deeper financial architecture connecting events that, on the surface, appear unrelated.