Will Zoho’s Arattai Succeed With Nationalism Spirit, Or Silently Fade Like Koo?

In early 2025, Union education minister Dharmendra Pradhan tweeted an appeal to switch from WhatsApp to Arattai, a messaging service built by Zoho. Within days the app surged to the top of Apple’s App Store in India. The minister described Arattai as a “free, easy‑to‑use, secure and safe” platform, aligning its adoption with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s call to embrace Swadeshi products. Suddenly a two‑year‑old project found itself at the centre of India’s nationalist tech narrative and its servers buckled under the weight of hundreds of thousands of new sign‑ups.

The excitement around Arattai isn’t an isolated story. Over the past five years, India has launched a series of Made‑in‑India apps designed to replace foreign digital platforms; like Koo for Twitter, Moj and Josh for TikTok, Ola Maps for Google Maps and Sandes for WhatsApp. Ministers promote these ventures at rallies and in social‑media posts, linking their success to Aatmanirbhar Bharat (self‑reliant India) and the narrative of digital sovereignty. Yet most of these initiatives fade quietly once the publicity dies, often buried by structural problems that political slogans cannot fix. Let’s see whether Arattai is different or simply the latest entrant in a long line of nationalist apps that promise much and deliver little.

The anatomy of Arattai

Designed for low‑bandwidth India

Arattai, Tamil for casual chat, has been in development since 2021, when WhatsApp’s privacy‑policy update prompted users to explore alternatives. Zoho built the app with features mirroring WhatsApp, like text messaging, voice and video calls, media sharing, group chats supporting up to 1 000 members, stories and broadcast channels. What differentiates Arattai is its focus on low‑end phones and patchy rural connectivity. Founder Sridhar Vembu said Zoho tests the app on 8 kilobit‑per‑second connections and emphasises privacy and security while keeping it easy to use. Arattai also allows group channels and broadcast messages for community organisations, reflecting its ambition to be more than a simple chat app.

The ministerial boost

For two years, Arattai’s user base remained small, with about 3000 sign‑ups per day. That changed in September 2025 when Dharmendra Pradhan and IT minister Ashwini Vaishnaw publicly endorsed the app. Pradhan urged citizens to adopt the “free, easy‑to‑use, secure and safe” platform, linking it to the Swadeshi initiative.

Zoho was unprepared for the sudden 100‑fold surge; new sign‑ups jumped from 3000 to 350000 per day in just three days. Vembu acknowledged that Arattai was still in beta, writing on X that he had planned a major release in November but the surge forced the team to accelerate capacity upgrades and fine‑tune code. He appealed for patience, signing off with “Jai Hind”, which is an explicit invocation of nationalism.

Security gaps and teething problems

While the app encrypts voice and video calls end‑to‑end, its text messages lack default encryption. Zoho admits this is a significant gap and says end‑to‑end encryption for chats is under development. As the user numbers spiked, the company warned users to expect OTP delays, slower contact sync and dropped calls because of unexpected load. WhatsApp’s dominance underscores the challenge as the Meta‑owned platform has more than 500 million users in India and offers comprehensive end‑to‑end encryption. Arattai must catch up on security and reliability to compete.

A cautionary tale: the rise and fall of Koo

Early promise and multilingual ambitions

Before Arattai, the poster child of India’s digital nationalism was Koo. Launched in 2020, Koo positioned itself as a microblogging platform “built for India” with support for multiple regional languages. A report claimed the platform crossed 60 million downloads, with about 60 % Hindi users, 20 % other vernacular languages and only 20 % English speakers. Koo’s founders said they wanted to provide a space for Indians to express themselves in their own dialects and even planned to expand to markets like Brazil and the United States.

Koo’s golden moment came in early 2021 when a dispute between Twitter and the Indian government over content removal led ministers and supporters to flock to the home‑grown platform. Commerce minister Piyush Goyal and others invited people to “join Koo,” and the app briefly became a trending alternative. For a time, it seemed India had produced a viable competitor to an American social‑media giant.

However, Koo lacked a clear differentiator beyond multilingual support. Social‑media researcher Joyojeet Pal told that a new platform needs a unique feature, voice or video‑based communication to succeed. Koo’s user experience mirrored Twitter without offering anything distinct, and user engagement remained shallow. Despite claims of tens of millions of downloads, the platform saw declining activity; by 2024, its user base reportedly dropped from 7.2 million to 2.7 million and the app faced difficulty moderating hate speech, which fuelled its perception as an echo chamber for right‑leaning voices.

As global funding dried up, Koo struggled to raise new capital. According to Reuters, co‑founders Aprameya Radhakrishna and Mayank Bidawatka said in July 2024 that partnership talks had fallen through and the company would discontinue its service. The founders noted that a dearth of funding and high technology costs made it impossible to keep the platform running.

Koo’s rapid demise underscores the difficulty of sustaining a social‑media network without deep pockets. Even though Koo raised over $60 million from investors such as Tiger Global and Accel, it could not secure long‑term capital to compete with X. In an interview, Radhakrishna lamented that building “world‑beating products” from India requires patient, long‑term capital, not short‑term profit expectations. Without such support, Koo, once valued at around $275 million became another cautionary tale of hype without sustainability.

Indian clones versus global titans

Short‑video platforms: Moj, Josh and friends

When the Indian government banned TikTok in 2020, domestic companies rushed to fill the void. Apps like Moj, Josh, Chingari and Roposo promised to be India’s TikTok. They lured users and influencers with lucrative incentives, and early numbers were impressive. Moj and Josh together reportedly amassed around 300 million monthly users. Yet, these apps pay celebrities and creators to post content, which is an unsustainable business model.

Creators often view followers on Instagram and YouTube as more valuable, and brands avoid Indian short‑video apps because they lack effective engagement metrics and have inconsistent content quality. Parent companies burn through cash, Moj’s parent posted a $175 million loss and Josh’s parent lost about $98 million, while the audience returns to global platforms that offer better monetisation and broader reach.

Map wars: Ola Maps versus Google Maps

In 2024, ride‑hailing giant Ola announced its own mapping platform, promising an indigenous alternative to Google Maps. CEO Bhavish Aggarwal argued that Western apps “don’t understand local challenges” and boasted that tens of thousands of customers were using Ola Maps every day. But the scale difference is stark. Google Maps processes over 50 million searches daily and navigates 2.5 billion kilometres in India.

More damningly, MapmyIndia CEO Rohan Verma dismissed Ola’s mapping claims as a “gimmick”. In an interview, he said building accurate maps requires significant investment and expertise, which Ola lacks. Verma noted that people were complaining that Ola’s updated cab and electric‑scooter apps had “pathetic” maps causing problems. He warned users to be wary of “fly‑by‑night products” and emphasised that accurate mapping is difficult. MapmyIndia even sent Ola a legal notice for allegedly breaching a license agreement, highlighting the messy underbelly of creating indigenous alternatives.

Government messaging: Sandes and other indigenous services

The government itself has tried to build secure communication tools. The Sandes app, developed by the National Informatics Centre (NIC), is a Government Instant Messaging System (GIMS) aimed at officials and the public. It offers group making, broadcast messaging, message forwarding and confidential tagging.

Chats can be backed up to a user’s email, but there is no option to transfer chat history between platforms and users must re‑register if they change their email or phone number. The app allows marking a message as confidential, signalling that it should not be shared. Despite these features, Sandes remains largely unknown outside government circles. Its clunky registration process and limited network effect show that technical capability alone cannot drive adoption.

Structural challenges: beyond the interface

Bureaucratic hurdles and regulatory fragmentation

A recurring obstacle for Indian startups is the country’s regulatory environment. An analysis by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) notes that while India’s Startup India initiative aims to remove bureaucratic red tape, permitting and tax processes remain burdensome. Startups must obtain numerous clearances, register property and navigate varying state regulations. Even programs intended to support startups impose strict eligibility criteria, and once a company exceeds certain revenue thresholds it becomes ineligible for benefits. A third of entrepreneurs surveyed said they would consider relocating abroad due to compliance and tax burdens.

Funding is another major constraint. ORF notes that 2023 saw a five‑year low in startup funding; domestic lending rates are high and government‑backed loans involve complex processes. Without patient capital, building long‑term products like social‑media platforms or mapping services is nearly impossible. The Koo founders’ lament that “world‑beating products” require long‑term capital resonates across the ecosystem.

Politics over substance

The gap between political rhetoric and operational support is stark. Ministers often unveil Indian apps with fanfare, tying them to Aatmanirbhar Bharat and Digital Sovereignty. Yet these endorsements rarely translate into sustained institutional backing. Piyush Goyal’s April 2025 speech at Startup Mahakumbh criticised startups for focusing on food delivery and gaming apps instead of semiconductors and AI. He accused them of turning “unemployed youth into cheap labour so the rich can get their meals”. Founders rebutted that innovation in consumer services is valuable and argued that such criticism ignores the systemic difficulties they face. The tension reveals a government that uses startups as both political symbols and whipping boys, without addressing the structural factors limiting their growth.

Can Arattai break the pattern?

Strengths and opportunities

Arattai’s focus on low‑bandwidth optimisation and rural accessibility gives it a niche that global giants often overlook. In a country where millions still rely on basic smartphones and patchy networks, an app designed to function at 8 kilobits per second has a clear value proposition. Zoho’s track record of building profitable SaaS products without external funding means it can commit resources patiently, shielded from quarterly pressure. Vembu argued that public companies might not invest in such long‑term engineering, hinting that Zoho’s private structure could be an asset.

Arattai could also integrate with India’s digital public infrastructure, such as Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC), to become a platform for payments, commerce and government services. Its indigenous identity may appeal to users concerned about data sovereignty, especially if Zoho delivers promised end‑to‑end encryption for text chats.

Obstacles to overcome

However, Arattai faces formidable headwinds. Network effects dominate messaging; people use the service their friends use. WhatsApp’s ubiquity means new entrants must offer not just parity but compelling differentiation. Arattai’s current security gap, with unencrypted text messages, undermines its privacy positioning. To gain trust, Zoho must not only add encryption but prove its systems are secure and transparent.

Another challenge is sustainable funding and scale. Arattai’s surge was driven by ministerial endorsements rather than organic adoption. If the government’s attention shifts, user growth could stall. The comparison with Koo is instructive. Once political momentum faded and funding dried up, Koo collapsed. Zoho may have deeper pockets than a startup, but running a messaging platform for tens of millions of users requires continuous investment in infrastructure, moderation and compliance.

Finally, Arattai must navigate India’s regulatory maze. Data localisation rules, encryption mandates, and potential liabilities for user‑generated content make messaging services a politically sensitive space. Without clear guidelines and consistent policy, the app’s future could be shaped by arbitrary government interventions, as seen with the bans on TikTok and the battles over Twitter.

At the end, is the hope tempered with realism?

Arattai’s sudden rise demonstrates the power of nationalism and ministerial support in shaping tech adoption narratives in India. But the story of Koo, and the struggles of Moj, Josh and Ola Maps, remind us that hype alone cannot sustain a digital platform. Building resilient, world‑class apps requires patient capital, technical excellence, regulatory clarity and user‑centric innovation. The Indian government can help by simplifying compliance, providing long‑term funding mechanisms and fostering open standards instead of proclaiming self‑reliance without structural support.

Zoho has some advantages, like a private ownership structure that allows long‑term thinking, an existing suite of enterprise products to cross‑subsidise Arattai, and a focus on low‑bandwidth environments. If Arattai can address its security gaps, avoid the pitfalls of over‑reliance on political support, and deliver differentiated value, it might carve out a sustainable niche. Yet, as the demise of Koo illustrates, nationalism is not a business model. For India’s home‑grown apps to thrive, they must compete on quality, innovation and trust, not just on the flag they carry.