The Trimurti Roop Kishore Madan, Bela Madan, Sanjay Thukral & Their Abode Magic Infosolutions & AIMS SANYA DEVELOPERS Involved In Multi-Billion Dollars Scam Across NCR
The Trio Roop Kishore Madan, Bela Madan, Sanjay Thukral Offered Subvention Schemes, Banks Loans & Properties In Collaboration With Canara Bank & Godrej Properties
Inside the Alleged Builder-Subvention Network: The Questions Surrounding Roop Kishore Madan, Bela Madan and Gurugram’s Real-Estate Financing Game
How allegedly engineered home-loan transactions, individual credit profiles and an interconnected corporate network raise uncomfortable questions about the flow of money in Gurugram’s property market
By Investigative Desk
Gurugram’s real-estate market has always been a place where money moves at extraordinary speed.
Land is acquired, projects are announced, apartments are sold, bank loans are sanctioned, investors enter and exit, companies change hands and thousands of crores can move through layers of corporate entities without the ordinary consumer ever seeing the complete financial picture.
But beneath the glossy towers, luxury apartments and premium hospitality projects lies a far more uncomfortable question:
What happens when an individual’s personal creditworthiness becomes the financial instrument through which a developer obtains access to comparatively cheaper retail housing finance?
That question assumes even greater significance when allegations emerge that homebuyers—or individuals presented as homebuyers—may have been recruited not primarily because they wanted to purchase property, but because their credit profiles could be used to obtain bank financing.
At the centre of allegations requiring close scrutiny are Roop Kishore Madan and Bela Madan, associated with Magic Info Solutions Private Limited and a wider network of real-estate and hospitality businesses.
Public corporate records identify Roop Kishore Madan and Bela Madan as directors of Magic Info Solutions Private Limited, a Delhi-based real-estate company incorporated in 2006.
The allegations surrounding certain property transactions attributed to the network are serious: that financially sound individuals may have been offered returns of roughly 4–5% to participate in builder-linked property transactions; that the money representing their initial contribution was allegedly routed to them and then transferred back to the developer; that bank loans were subsequently sanctioned against the property transactions; that repayment obligations were allegedly serviced by developer-side entities; and that the underlying properties were later dealt with through resale or other transactions.
If proven in a particular case, such a structure would raise much deeper questions than an ordinary dispute between a builder and a purchaser.
It could raise questions about the true purpose of the loan, the authenticity of the underlying transaction, the source of the borrower’s contribution, the identity of the real economic beneficiary and the adequacy of the bank’s due diligence.
And this is where the story becomes impossible to ignore.
The scheme allegedly begins with the person—not the property
The most striking allegation is that the proposed participant does not necessarily begin with a desire to buy a home.
The starting point, according to the allegations, is allegedly the individual’s credit profile.
A person with a high civil score, stable financial history and a clean banking record is potentially valuable because the banking system may regard that person as a relatively low-risk home-loan borrower.
The proposition allegedly put before such individuals is simple:
Take a property loan.
Allow the transaction to be structured through a builder-subvention arrangement.
Receive a relatively small return—reported in the allegations at around 4–5%.
The developer, meanwhile, allegedly obtains access to the much cheaper financing available through retail housing loans.
That is the point where a supposedly ordinary property sale can acquire a completely different economic character.
The fundamental question becomes:
Is the person actually purchasing a property, or is the person’s borrowing capacity being monetised?
That distinction is not semantic.
It goes to the heart of the transaction.
The alleged circular movement of the buyer’s money
According to the allegations, the purported structure works through a cycle that, on paper, can appear completely conventional.
The individual is allegedly approached.
The developer or an associated entity allegedly provides the money required to create the appearance of the buyer’s upfront contribution.
That amount is then allegedly transferred back to the developer through the individual’s bank account.
A formal tripartite agreement is executed between the purchaser, the developer and the lending bank.
The bank sanctions the home loan.
The bank disburses the loan against the property.
The individual becomes the legal borrower.
Yet, according to the allegations, the economic burden of the loan is not actually borne by the individual.
The developer or associated persons allegedly continue paying the EMI or pre-EMI.
The property may then be resold, reassigned or otherwise monetised.
The alleged participant receives the promised return.
The developer gets access to bank finance.
And the bank is left holding a loan formally issued to an individual.
If that sequence can be demonstrated through contemporaneous bank statements, loan files, agreements and property records, it would demand an explanation from every institution involved.
Because the most important question would then be:
Who was actually borrowing the money?
The name on the loan document may say one thing.
The money trail could potentially say something very different.
Why builder subvention schemes are now under an extraordinary judicial spotlight
This controversy cannot be viewed in isolation.
The Supreme Court of India has already been examining serious allegations surrounding builder-linked subvention schemes across the National Capital Region.
In its proceedings in Himanshu Singh v. Union of India, the Court described the common structure of the schemes before it: builders/developers promised to pay EMI or pre-EMI obligations on home loans taken by buyers, and the arrangements were commonly implemented through tripartite agreements involving the builder, homebuyer and bank or financial institution.
The Court recorded that in many cases builders subsequently stopped paying the promised EMIs. Banks then began demanding payments from the homebuyers, even in circumstances where projects were incomplete and possession had not been offered.
That alone exposed a fundamental weakness in the model.
The person who believed the builder was carrying the financing burden could ultimately discover that the legal liability remained his or hers.
But the Supreme Court went further.
The Court said it had prima facie found an “unholy nexus” between banks/HFCs and builder-cum-developers and involved the CBI in examining the issue.
This is not a casual observation.
It is a judicial direction arising from a national-level dispute over how builder-linked financing was being structured and administered.
The CBI investigation has now moved beyond rhetoric
The matter has subsequently developed into actual investigative proceedings.
In a Supreme Court order dated February 4, 2026, the Court recorded that 28 regular cases had been registered by the CBI, of which 22 related to builders’ projects involving home loans under subvention schemes. The Court also recorded that those cases included the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, against unknown officials of financial institutions.
The Court further recorded that investigations remained ongoing in a substantial number of cases.
That development fundamentally changes the context.
Builder subvention schemes are no longer merely a matter for consumer complaints, civil litigation and RERA proceedings.
They have entered the arena of criminal investigation and institutional accountability.
That does not establish wrongdoing by Roop Kishore Madan or Bela Madan.
But it does mean that allegations resembling the mechanisms already under judicial scrutiny cannot simply be dismissed as an ordinary commercial dispute.
The Madan network: one company is only one part of the picture
Magic Info Solutions Private Limited is not an isolated corporate name.
Public corporate databases identify Roop Kishore Madan and Bela Madan as directors of the company. The company is classified in the real-estate sector and has a history extending back two decades.
Other publicly available corporate records associate Roop Kishore Madan with a range of Sanya-linked real-estate and hospitality companies.
This is important for investigative purposes because a transaction allegedly involving a particular company cannot be understood simply by looking at that company’s balance sheet.
Investigators have to ask:
Where did the money originate?
Where did it go next?
Which connected company received it?
Who controlled that company?
Did that company have a genuine commercial purpose?
Was the transaction recorded as a loan, advance, sale consideration, management fee, consultancy fee or something else?
Was there a corresponding asset or service?
The answers to those questions determine whether movement between related entities is ordinary corporate structuring or something potentially much more serious.
The hospitality empire makes the corporate picture even more complicated
The Madan-linked business universe also extends into hospitality.
Public corporate records identify Sanya Hospitality Private Limited as a company associated with the Madan family, while corporate records for Sanya Resorts and Hospitality Private Limited also show Roop Kishore Madan as a director and record Bela Madan’s earlier directorship.
The Gurugram hotel operation associated with the Sanya group is the Courtyard by Marriott Gurugram Downtown, a Marriott-branded property in Sushant Lok-I, Gurugram.
The existence of a Marriott-branded hotel is, by itself, obviously not evidence of wrongdoing.
Neither is the existence of numerous companies.
Neither is the use of multiple subsidiaries.
The significance lies elsewhere.
When allegations involve money supposedly moving from property transactions into other companies, the wider corporate network becomes relevant because investigators must determine whether those transfers represented legitimate business activity or were simply different channels through which funds were moved.
That is an accounting question.
And accounting leaves evidence.
The 4–5% promise could be the smallest part of a much larger equation
The alleged participant is reportedly offered a return of around 4–5%.
At first glance, that might not look extraordinary.
But the real calculation is not the return to the individual.
It is the size of the loan generated using that individual’s identity.
Suppose an individual receives a 5% incentive for facilitating a transaction.
The individual’s return might be modest.
But if that individual enables a large home loan, the financing obtained by the developer can be many times larger than the incentive paid to the participant.
The economic equation then becomes remarkably attractive from the perspective of someone seeking cheaper capital.
The individual gets a fee.
The bank provides retail housing finance.
The developer gets access to the money.
The developer allegedly remains responsible for servicing the loan.
And the formal borrower becomes the person whose credit score made the transaction possible.
That is why the alleged model deserves to be examined at scale.
One transaction could be an anomaly.
Twenty similar transactions are a pattern.
Hundreds would be something else entirely.
The critical difference between retail housing finance and developer finance
This allegation also exposes an obvious financial incentive.
A developer ordinarily finances its business through a mixture of equity, internal accruals, project finance, construction finance and other forms of institutional borrowing.
Those forms of finance are subject to their own pricing and underwriting.
A home loan, by contrast, is designed for an individual purchasing a residential property.
The economic proposition becomes deeply troubling if a developer can allegedly convert corporate borrowing into retail housing finance by placing an individual borrower between the bank and the developer.
The question is not whether a person signed the loan documents.
The question is whether the bank was lending to the individual for a genuine home purchase, or whether the transaction was allegedly structured primarily to channel money into the developer’s hands.
That is exactly why source-of-funds analysis becomes so important.
The “down payment” question may hold the key
One of the most important documents in any such investigation would be the bank statement of the purported homebuyer.
The question investigators should ask is brutally simple:
Where did the buyer’s down payment come from?
Was it accumulated from salary or business income?
Was it a genuine savings contribution?
Was it borrowed from family?
Or did the same developer—or a connected company—first transfer the money into the buyer’s account and then receive it back?
If the last scenario is proven repeatedly, it would fundamentally change the character of the alleged transactions.
The issue would no longer be simply whether the buyer technically made a down payment.
It would be whether the down payment was economically genuine.
A money trail can distinguish between the two.
Who actually paid the EMI?
This may be even more revealing.
In a genuine builder subvention arrangement, the developer may contractually undertake to pay pre-EMI or EMI for a defined period.
That is not, in itself, illegal.
But the question becomes much more serious where the alleged arrangement involves the developer effectively carrying the entire loan while the home loan remains legally in the name of the individual.
A bank investigating such a transaction would reasonably need to know:
Who funded each payment?
From which account?
Was the payment made directly to the bank?
Was the money first routed through the borrower?
Was the developer’s obligation disclosed to the bank?
What happened when the property was sold?
These are not abstract questions.
Every EMI produces a banking record.
And then comes the property itself
A central feature of the allegations is the claim that the property is subsequently sold to someone else.
That raises a fundamental question:
Why was the original individual brought into the transaction in the first place?
If the apartment was always meant to be occupied by the borrower, a later sale may simply represent an ordinary property disposal.
But if the individual allegedly had no genuine intention of purchasing the property, never intended to live there, did not bear the financing burden and was recruited primarily because of a strong credit profile, then the economic rationale could be radically different.
Investigators would therefore need to examine:
the buyer’s correspondence with the developer;
the payment history;
the possession records;
the allotment documents;
the property registration;
the eventual resale;
the identity of the next purchaser;
and the movement of the resale proceeds.
This is where an alleged scheme either collapses under scrutiny—or begins to reveal a pattern.
The bank’s role cannot be ignored
There is an uncomfortable tendency in financial scandals to focus exclusively on builders.
That is inadequate.
If a bank lends money against an apparently genuine home purchase, the bank has its own underwriting responsibilities.
That is especially true when multiple unusual features allegedly exist simultaneously:
a buyer with no obvious need for the property;
a developer-linked payment into the buyer’s account;
a matching transfer back to the developer;
a tripartite agreement;
rapid loan disbursement;
developer-funded EMI payments;
and a subsequent property transaction.
Any one of those may have an innocent explanation.
The combination is what investigators should examine.
The Supreme Court has already demanded information relating to the banks and HFCs involved in subvention schemes and directed scrutiny of issues including disbursement and recovery practices.
The question for any bank allegedly involved in a comparable arrangement is therefore straightforward:
What did the bank know, and what did it verify?
Canara Bank: the questions are institutional, not personal
Canara Bank has been named in the allegations surrounding the purported transactions.
That allegation must be treated separately from the existence of the bank’s ordinary lending business.
The mere fact that a Canara Bank branch approved a home loan does not establish that any bank employee participated in wrongdoing.
But where a pattern of allegedly similar transactions exists, the bank’s internal process becomes a legitimate area of investigation.
Investigators would need to establish:
How were borrowers sourced?
Who introduced them?
Were their own contributions independently verified?
Were developer-funded payments visible?
Were construction milestones checked?
Were disbursements made in accordance with the lending terms?
Who monitored the account after disbursement?
Were the EMI payments actually made by the borrower?
Were any warning signals reported internally?
Those are questions of bank governance and credit control.
And if the same pattern is repeated across multiple loans, those questions become increasingly difficult to ignore.
The Godrej connection demands precision, not sensationalism
There is another name that inevitably enters the conversation because of publicly documented commercial relationships involving the Sanya Group: Godrej Properties.
Publicly available material concerning the Godrej Summit project identifies the Sanya Group among the project partners.
That commercial association is a matter of public record.
But an association with a project does not establish participation in a fraud.
There is currently a critical difference between saying:
“Godrej had a project association with the Sanya Group.”
and saying:
“Godrej participated in an alleged loan fraud.”
The first proposition can be supported by public material.
The second requires evidence.
A responsible investigation should therefore ask whether any alleged subvention transactions intersected with Godrej-linked projects, whether any common financial arrangements existed, and whether the company or its personnel had knowledge of any alleged irregularity.
Those questions deserve answers.
They should not be replaced by accusations unsupported by documents.
The real scandal, if proven, would be bigger than one builder
The most damaging possibility is not that a handful of borrowers were manipulated.
It is that a repeatable financing mechanism could allegedly have been created.
A mechanism where:
Creditworthy individual enters.
Developer allegedly funds buyer contribution.
Buyer allegedly returns the money.
Bank finances the property.
Developer allegedly services the loan.
Property is later monetised.
Connected companies allegedly receive subsequent funds.
The individual receives a small incentive.
And then the cycle begins again.
That is no longer simply a property sale.
It is a credit-generation model.
And the scale of such a model would depend not on the number of apartments sold, but on the number and value of loans generated.
That is why the alleged scheme, if proven, could have implications far beyond individual purchasers.
It could potentially expose vulnerabilities in India’s retail-credit system.
The illusion of a clean loan
This is the uncomfortable paradox.
A loan can be perfectly documented and still conceal a problematic transaction.
There may be:
a signed application,
a registered sale deed,
a sanctioned loan,
a tripartite agreement,
a mortgage,
bank statements,
and regular EMI payments.
Everything can look legitimate.
Until someone traces the money backwards.
Who funded the down payment?
Who received it?
Who funded the EMI?
Who ultimately owned the economic interest?
Who received the resale proceeds?
Which company booked the profit?
Who controlled that company?
That is where the apparent simplicity of a home loan can disappear.
The Supreme Court’s builder-subvention investigation should be a warning to the entire sector
The Supreme Court’s intervention makes one point impossible to ignore.
Subvention structures may look attractive to consumers because the developer promises to shoulder the initial financing cost.
But the Court’s proceedings show how quickly the arrangement can become dangerous when developers stop making those payments and banks pursue the nominal borrowers.
By February 2026, the Court had recorded that the CBI had registered 28 regular cases, with 22 connected to builders’ projects involving subvention home loans, and that investigations remained active.
The message is unmistakable:
builder-subvention finance is no longer a niche consumer issue.
It is a matter of potential financial-system abuse when the facts support that conclusion.
The uncomfortable questions for Roop Kishore Madan and Bela Madan
The public deserves answers to questions that are substantially more specific than broad denials.
Were individuals with high credit scores approached for property transactions primarily because of their ability to obtain bank finance?
Were any individuals promised returns of approximately 4–5% for participating?
Did any developer-associated entity provide money for buyers’ purported initial contributions?
Did those individuals subsequently transfer that money back to the developer or a connected company?
Were loans then sanctioned by banks against those transactions?
Who actually serviced those loans?
How many properties were involved?
How many borrowers participated?
What was the aggregate loan amount?
How much money was disbursed?
Where did that money ultimately go?
Were properties subsequently transferred or resold?
Who received the resale proceeds?
Were funds transferred into other companies controlled by connected persons?
Were those transfers backed by genuine commercial consideration?
Were all such transactions properly reflected in statutory accounts?
And most importantly:
Were the lending banks told the complete truth about the financial arrangements between the developer and the nominal borrower?
Those questions are capable of being answered with documents.
The answers should therefore be obtainable.
The money trail should be the final judge
This story should not be decided by social connections.
It should not be decided by the size of a hotel.
It should not be decided by the prestige of a corporate brand.
It should not be decided by the political influence of an individual.
And it should not be decided by the volume of advertising money in the real-estate ecosystem.
It should be decided by the records.
Bank statements.
Loan files.
Tripartite agreements.
Property registries.
Company ledgers.
GST records.
Related-party disclosures.
Inter-company transfers.
EMI payment trails.
Resale documents.
Beneficial ownership records.
Put those documents side by side and the truth becomes considerably harder to hide.
A system built on paperwork can still fail without scrutiny
The most disturbing question arising from allegations of this nature is not whether a builder can create a complicated document trail.
Of course one can.
The question is whether India’s financial institutions are actually capable of looking beyond the paperwork.
A bank should not merely ask:
“Has the buyer signed the agreement?”
It should also ask:
“Who funded the buyer?”
It should not merely ask:
“Was the loan sanctioned?”
It should ask:
“Why is this loan economically being serviced by someone other than the borrower?”
It should not merely ask:
“Is there a property?”
It should ask:
“Is this a genuine purchase, or is the property being used as the legal wrapper for another financing transaction?”
Those questions become particularly important when dozens of apparently unrelated borrowers begin exhibiting identical financial behaviour.
The line between aggressive finance and fraud is evidence
There is a legitimate need to be precise here.
A builder can lawfully offer a subvention scheme.
A developer can lawfully service pre-EMI under a contractual arrangement.
A company can lawfully transfer funds to an affiliated company.
An individual can lawfully buy a property and sell it later.
A bank can lawfully approve a housing loan.
None of those facts, individually, amounts to fraud.
The problem arises when the entire arrangement is allegedly designed to deceive the lender, conceal the true source of funds, manipulate the apparent borrower contribution or shift economic risk onto someone who is not the real beneficiary of the transaction.
That is why evidence—not rhetoric—must determine what happened.
The bigger question: is Gurugram’s real-estate market financing property or manufacturing credit?
This may ultimately be the most consequential question arising from the allegations.
India’s real-estate sector has repeatedly experimented with innovative financing structures.
But innovation becomes dangerous when financial engineering begins to obscure who is actually taking the risk.
If a company genuinely needs corporate capital, it should ordinarily raise corporate capital.
If an individual genuinely wants a home, the individual should genuinely borrow for that home.
What becomes problematic is the alleged middle ground in which a person’s identity, credit score and legal liability are used to obtain financing that economically benefits someone else.
That is not merely a question for one builder.
It is a question for banks, regulators, auditors, RERA authorities, investigators and ultimately the financial system itself.
The unanswered story
For now, the most important part of this story remains unanswered.
Were the alleged transactions isolated incidents, aggressive but legitimate financial arrangements, or part of a systematic financing model?
Were the people entering the deals genuine homebuyers?
Or were they effectively acting as borrowers for someone else’s benefit?
Did the money actually move in a circular pattern?
Did developers actually service the loans?
Were the properties genuinely purchased?
Were they subsequently sold?
Did proceeds move into connected entities?
And did the banks know the entire story?
These are not questions that can be settled through corporate brochures or carefully worded statements.
They require forensic examination.
Gurugram’s glittering towers deserve a closer look at the foundations
The real-estate industry survives on confidence.
Buyers trust developers.
Banks trust documentation.
Investors trust financial statements.
Regulators trust disclosures.
And the public assumes that when a major bank finances a property transaction, somebody has already checked whether the transaction makes economic sense.
When that chain of trust breaks, the consequences can spread far beyond a single apartment.
The allegations surrounding Roop Kishore Madan and Bela Madan therefore deserve to be investigated on the evidence—not amplified as established fact, but also not buried merely because the individuals involved operate substantial businesses and prestigious properties.
The Supreme Court’s ongoing subvention proceedings have already demonstrated that builder-bank financing structures can become matters of national institutional concern.
The next logical question is whether other allegedly similar transactions exist elsewhere in the NCR.
And if they do, the answer may not lie in the property registry.
It may lie in the bank account of the person who supposedly bought the property.
Because in an alleged scheme built around credit, the apartment may only be the façade.
The real asset may be the borrower’s creditworthiness.
And the real story may be hidden not in the sale deed, but in the money trail behind it.
Editorial Note
The allegations concerning Roop Kishore Madan, Bela Madan, Magic Info Solutions Private Limited, Sanya-linked entities, Canara Bank and any other party mentioned in connection with the alleged scheme are allegations requiring documentary and investigative verification. The existence of directorships, corporate relationships, property projects or lending arrangements does not by itself establish fraud, conspiracy, corruption or money laundering. Any final determination of criminal liability rests with competent investigative and judicial authorities.
The references to the Supreme Court and CBI in this article concern the separately documented nationwide/NCR builder-subvention proceedings and should not be read as establishing that the individuals or entities named in the allegations above are parties to those proceedings unless independently established by the record.
