Ola Electric has burned through cash for years. In FY2020–21 it posted a ₹200 crore net loss despite zero sales. The losses then roughly doubled every year:

• ₹784 crore in FY22,
• ₹1,472 crore in FY23, 
• ₹1,584 crore in FY24.

For FY25 the hemorrhage only deepened: full-year net loss ₹2,276 crore (against ₹1,584 crore in FY24) on revenue of ₹4,514 crore (down from ₹5,010 crore). In short, Ola’s two‑wheeler business has never turned a profit since inception as losses have piled up with each successive quarter.

Hyundai/Kia Exit and Block Deals

The latest blow came in mid-2025, when strategic backers bailed. South Korea’s Hyundai Motor Company sold its entire 2.47% stake (≈10.9 crore shares) for ₹552 crore, and sister firm Kia Corp. offloaded 0.62% (2.7 crore shares) for ₹137 crore. The buyers were not retail punters but institutional: Citigroup Global Markets Mauritius picked up roughly 1.95% (8.61 crore shares) for ₹435 crore. No details were disclosed about other large buyers. This block trade executed at ~₹50.55 per share sent Ola’s stock plunging ~8% in one day and reflected deep unease. In fact, the share is now trading in the ₹49–52 range (May 2025), after peaking near ₹157 at its August 2024 IPO.

Q4 FY25 and FY24 Results

Ola’s most recent quarterly results underscore the deterioration. In Q4 FY25 (Jan–Mar 2025), Ola Electric lost ₹870 crore (consolidated) double the ₹416 crore loss in Q4 FY24, on just ₹611 crore of revenue (a 62% plunge from ₹1,598 crore). For the full FY25, that means losses widened to ₹2,276 crore (from ₹1,584 cr in FY24). Operating revenue similarly slid in FY25. Unsurprisingly, the stock has suffered: shares fell 7–8% on the day of the block deals, and remain far below list price.

Investor Sentiment and New Stakeholders

The exit of Hyundai and Kia, marquee automotive investors is a glaring red flag to analysts and shareholders. Citigroup’s entry (through its Mauritius arm) provided some buying support, but the fact that only hedge funds and anonymous block buyers stepped in has not restored confidence. Veteran analyst Gaurang Shah of Geojit warns of “mounting losses estimated at ₹1,500 crore [~$180M] during the IPO period, escalating rapidly” and growing customer complaints and regulatory headaches. In short, sophisticated investors are voting with their feet, while the management talks up profitability targets. The mixed signals leave the market jittery.

Market Position, Manufacturing Scale, and Policy Context

At its peak, Ola Electric claimed a dominant market share in India’s e‑scooter segment. Its FY24 RHP showed ~90% revenue growth to ₹5,009 cr and boasted “dominance with over 50% market share”. In calendar 2024 Ola was indeed the largest seller (≈4.07 lakh scooters). Its ambitious Pochampalli gigafactory in Tamil Nadu, touted as the world’s largest two-wheeler factory (500 acres, ₹2,400 cr investment), having an initial cell capacity of ~1.5 GWh, aiming to cut battery costs. That plant is even in India’s battery “PLI” incentive scheme. The government’s EV push (FAME incentives, PLI, GST benefits, etc.) should help Ola, but in practice subsidies and infrastructure have mainly helped legacy auto makers adapt too.

Competition is fierce. Legacy players TVS, Bajaj, Hero Electric and startups like Ather have eaten into Ola’s base. In May 2025, TVS led EV 2W sales (~24,560 units, 24% share), Bajaj was close behind (~21,770 units, 22%), while Ola slipped to third (~18,499 units, 18%). (By contrast, Bajaj and TVS share surged as Ola sales plunged.)

Ather Energy sold ~1.55 lakh scooters in FY25 and even outpaced Ola’s Q4 revenue (Ather Q4 ≈₹676 cr vs. Ola’s ₹611 cr). In fact, brokers at Kotak now note Ola “sold fewer electric scooters than established brands TVS and Bajaj” through early 2025. Technologically, Ola is investing heavily developing its own 4680-format battery cells and even eyeing solid-state, but so far relies on imported Li-ion packs. It has yet to commercially reap those R&D bets.

Key Challenges: Price, Batteries, Safety, Service, Bottlenecks

Ola faces a litany of obstacles.

Pricing: Its scooters are positioned at the premium end. For example, the base S1 Pro (3 kWh) Gen3 starts around ₹1.44 lakh (ex-showroom), rising to ~₹1.99 lakh for the top model, which is well above many rivals. To drive sales it has resorted to steep discounts and dumping low-end models. Analysts note 70% of Q4 volumes were entry-level scooters (vs 43% a year ago), dragging down average selling price and margins.

Battery & Range: The S1 Pro claims 176–242 km range, but real-world performance and battery degradation have drawn complaints (and scrutiny). Ola has delayed integrating its new cells into vehicles, citing low yields (~60%) and the need to improve production stability. Until in‑house cells kick in, Ola depends on external suppliers, keeping costs high.

Safety Recalls: Ola’s reputation has been damaged by fires and defects. Following high-profile scooter fire incidents, Ola voluntarily recalled 1,441 S1 Pro units from a specific batch for diagnostics. Safety regulators have publicly warned companies to recall defective EVs. Media reports detail riders’ tales of sudden accelerations, fires and broken suspensions. Management has downplayed some cases, but the damage to brand trust is real.

Service Infrastructure: Customer support has been overwhelmed. India’s consumer watchdog has logged over 10,000 complaints in one year about Ola’s service delays and billing errors. Ola executives admit 80,000 service complaints per month flood their centers (6–7k on peak days). By September 2024, Ola built ~430 service centers nationwide, but users report weeks of waits even with paid support plans. Regulators have issued show-cause notices over unfair practices. In short, customers are furious and many may be defecting to better-supported brands.

Operational Bottlenecks: Rapid expansion exposed growing pains. An independent report by auditors (BSR & Co.) has flagged ₹2,391 crore negative operating cash flow in FY25, warning of going-concern risk. Growth targets have slipped: new models (Roadster, Gen3 S1+) have faced production snags and delayed launches. Dealers and analysts frequently cite long delivery delays for booked scooters. Kotak institutional equities notes “execution delays” especially in new products, slashed Ola’s FY26-27 volume estimates by ~33%, and warned Ola must rapidly scale or risk a cash crunch. The company’s reliance on continued cash infusions is exposed by its plan to raise up to ₹1,700 crore more debt (reportedly) just to meet upcoming liabilities.

Expert and Analyst Views on Profitability

The picture emerging from analysts is blunt. Many say Ola’s profitability targets are unrealistic under current conditions. After its IPO, brokerages have turned bearish; Kotak cut the stock to “Sell” with a ₹30 target, citing execution delays and lackluster demand. HSBC analysts who visited Ola service hubs found massive backlogs and inefficiencies, echoing government complaints.

Geojit’s Gaurang Shah warns of “deep concerns” given the company’s swelling losses, consumer troubles and stiff competition. Even within Ola’s filings the tone is cautious: the FY24 Red Herring Prospectus explicitly warns that near‑term losses may continue as it expands products and markets. CEO Bhavish Aggarwal now promises “gross margins of 28–30%” and claims Q1 FY26 will show improvement, but admits revenue will be half last year’s this quarter.

Public and private opinions differ. Management insists that new models, cost cuts (Project Lakshya) and internal cash reserves will carry Ola to profitability by FY26. Indeed, Ola says it reduced burn somewhat; its gross margin improved by 38 percentage points year-over-year in FY25, and it has lowered its auto-unit break-even to ~25,000 scooters/month (Project Lakshya). But even these bright spots have been doubted by markets. The Financial Express reports auditors have warned that Ola’s cash flows were so negative (₹23.91 billion outflow) that continuing operations is questionable. Analysts note that despite selling nearly 3.6 lakh scooters in FY25, Ola is now losing market share (roughly 27–30%) and selling less than legacy makers on a quarterly basis.

Outlook: Can Ola Be Profitable by FY26?

Ola’s management says “yes”, but the facts suggest it will be extraordinarily tough. To swing from a ₹2,276 crore annual loss to profit in one year would require a near-vertical improvement: either massive cost cutting, a surge in high-margin revenue, or both. Even optimistic projections assume only EBITDA profitability by FY26, not net profit. As it stands, the company burned over ₹5,000 crore (net loss plus cash burn) in the last year alone. With sales flat-to-down, competition heating up, and mounting debt, EBITDA breakeven may come, but sustainable net profit is doubtful.

In blunt terms, most experts doubt Ola will reach profitable earnings by FY26. Kotak warns the company “must scale up quickly to avoid a cash crunch”, implying a narrow margin for error. If sales don’t rebound and costs don’t collapse, management’s targets could slip. The auditor’s going-concern warning and investors’ flight suggest the market sees a significant risk of failure; not irrationally, given the track record.

Ola Electric is burning cash at an unsustainably high rate amid intense operational woes. Despite lofty promises and a world-class factory, the company’s performance so far has been undermined by delays, recalls, and overwhelmed service. Major investors exiting (Hyundai/Kia) and auditors flagging red alerts imply that turning losses into profit by FY26 is far from guaranteed. Unless execution dramatically improves and market conditions perk up, Ola may struggle to survive as a standalone electric scooter venture.