“Dragon And Elephant Must Dance Together”: Will This ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai’ Rhythm Unbridled Optimism Or Complete Cynicism?
China FM Yi emphasized that border problems should not define relations and advocated mutual support for India. As we approach the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties, maybe this most sensible policy is cautious engagement, with a clear understanding of the promise and limitations of this complex relationship between both nations.

When China speaks of “Dragon and Elephant Dances,” it seems we have time-travelled back to the 1950s era of “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai.” The recent diplomatic overtures between these Asian giants bring to mind that famous saying about history: those who cannot remember the past are condemned to watch the same movie on repeat, just with different actors and fancier special effects.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent statement that “China has always believed that being mutually supportive partners and achieving the ‘Dragon and Elephant Dance’ is the only correct choice for both sides” sounds lovely in theory. It’s the geopolitical version of your ex texting, “We can be friends”, after a messy 5 year break-up filled with border skirmishes, military standoffs, and economic competition.
Let’s take a step back and understand what’s been happening between these two nuclear-armed neighbours over the past half-decade before we start planning the dance party (of Dragon and Elephant).
A Recap Of Blast From The Past About India-China Relations, Which Is Not-So-Gentle Art Of Border Tensions.
The past five years have seen India-China relations deteriorate to their lowest since the 1962 war. The Galwan Valley clash of June 2020 marked the first deadly confrontation between the two militaries in 45 years. What followed was a prolonged military standoff across multiple locations in eastern Ladakh, with thousands of troops facing off in harsh Himalayan conditions where even breathing is a challenge, let alone maintaining military readiness.
Is There Any Change In Historical Sino-India Relations?
While recent reports from last year suggest a breakthrough with troops withdrawing from Depsang and Demchok, the last two friction notes, it’s worth remembering that this comes after four years of tensions, multiple rounds of military commander-level talks, & significant economic measures taken by India against Chinese companies and investments. Four years of soldiers staring each other down across mountain tops questions the foundation for a trusting relationship.
The Chinese approach to border issues has been consistent like- create facts on the ground, then talk about peace while solidifying those gains. Wang’s statement that “border issues should not define the overall relationship” conveniently ignores that these “issues” involve territorial sovereignty—a matter both countries believe non-negotiable. It’s like saying the fact that someone has built a shed in your backyard shouldn’t affect your neighbourly relations.
The Economic Imbalance Cannot Be One-Way Traffic!
Behind the diplomatic niceties lies an economic relationship so lopsided that it would make a see-saw with the dragon on one end and an elephant, comparatively struggling, on the other side. The trade deficit between India-China has been in Beijing’s favour, reaching record levels, despite India’s attempts to reduce dependence on Chinese imports.
Chinese goods flood Indian markets, while Indian companies face non-tariff barriers when making an attempt to enter China. Even as Chinese FM speaks of “practical cooperation,” China continues to restrict Indian pharmaceuticals, IT services, and agricultural products from meaningful market access.
Perhaps most tellingly, Chinese investment in India has dried up since 2020, when India tightened its foreign investment rules following the border tensions. The economic relationship reflects the broader pattern: China expects concessions while offering tiny in return.
The same is also seen in the case of India-Korea relations, and Union Minister Piyush Goyal openly accepted this by saying that “two auto giants have enjoyed the benefits of our free-trade agreement with Korea and Japan and continue to import indiscriminately. So, they have cost us dearly, and I don’t mind saying it publicly”. So ‘Elephant needs to be very careful when the Dragon says it wants to have a mutual dance’!
The Pakistan Factor: The “Topic” in the Room
Any discussion of India-China relations that doesn’t mention Pakistan is like trying to discuss Hamlet without mentioning the prince of Denmark. China’s “all-weather friendship” with Pakistan, our hostile friend, remains one of India’s major security concerns.
Beijing has lased our hostile friend Pakistan with everything from nuclear technology to conventional weapons, built strategic infrastructure through disputed territories under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and consistently blocked India-focused counter-terrorism efforts at the UN. According to a 2001 Department of Defence report, China has supplied nuclear materials to Pakistan and provided critical technical assistance in the construction of nuclear weapons development facilities, in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which China is a signatory.
When Wang speaks of China and India as “important members of the Global South” who should “oppose hegemonism and power politics,” the irony is palpable. China’s own hegemonistic ambitions in Asia and its use of economic coercion as a political tool against smaller territories, from Australia to Lithuania, hardly position it as a champion against power politics.
Is this a hint about a new chapter or the same book with different cover art?
The October 2024 meeting between Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi in Kazan may indeed represent a tactical shift in approach from both sides. This was the October 2024 meeting in Kazan, Russia, where Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi discussed strategic direction for enhancing ties.
“China-India relations have made positive strides over the past year”, Chinese FM stated. Both Elephant and Dragon have since steadfastly adhered to their words, cementing diplomatic talks and practical collaboration at all levels. Following this, the revival of dialogue mechanisms like the Special Representatives talks and the Foreign Secretary-Vice Minister framework suggests both countries recognize the unsustainability of continued tensions.
However, fundamental issues remain unresolved. The border dispute isn’t just about a few kilometres of uninhabitable mountain terrain—it’s about national pride, historical narratives, and strategic positioning. China’s continued support to our hostile next Pakistan, its growing influence in India’s neighbourhood through the Belt and Road Initiative, and competition for influence in international institutions all contribute to an environment where genuine trust remains elusive.
The upcoming 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations 2025 provides a convenient backdrop for symbolic gestures and carefully worded statements about cooperation. But anniversaries, like New Year’s resolutions, often generate more rhetoric than substantive change.
Is There Hope for Improvement?
Despite the scepticism, there are reasons to believe gradual improvement is possible, and it should happen. Both Elepant and Dragon, have demonstrated they can compartmentalize issues when necessary. Trade continued to grow even during the border standoff, and both countries have cooperated in forums like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Additionally, both Modi and Xi have consolidated domestic power, potentially giving them the political capital to make difficult compromises if they choose to. The global context, including U.S.-China tensions and economic challenges post-pandemic, may also push both countries toward a more pragmatic approach.
Is There A Way Forward To Realistic Expectations?
Complete disengagement between two of the world’s largest countries, neighbours with a combined population of more than one-third of the world’s population, isn’t a viable long-term strategy either. The challenge for both countries is to develop a relationship based on realistic expectations rather than grandiose visions of partnership.
Perhaps the “Dragon and Elephant Dance” Wang envisions should be less of a synchronized performance and more of a carefully negotiated agreement to stay off each other’s toes while sharing the same dance floor. The two Asian giants are too big, too proud, and too historically conscious to overcome decades of mistrust easily. But they’re also too interconnected to afford continued hostility.
As we look toward the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations, perhaps the most sensible approach is neither unbridled optimism nor complete cynicism but cautious engagement with a clear-eyed recognition of this complex relationship’s possibilities and limitations. After all, even the most reluctant dance partners can sometimes find a rhythm that works—even if they keep a careful count of each other’s steps throughout the performance.