As Israel launched a wave of strikes on Iran’s military and nuclear sites last Friday, world leaders scrambled to urge calm, warning that this latest flare-up could send the entire region into a tailspin. But in the midst of mounting international condemnation, India took a noticeably different route: it chose not to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) collective rebuke of Israel.

That silence is ringing loud in diplomatic circles, especially given the context. This is the second major military exchange between Iran and Israel and in a back-and-forth triggered by Israeli strikes on Iranian soil and Tehran’s missile-heavy response.

According to Iranian officials, the latest Israeli attacks struck deep into cities including Tehran, hitting both residential zones and strategic infrastructure. At least 80 people were reported killed, among them civilians, nuclear scientists, university professors, and senior commanders of the Revolutionary Guard.

The escalation didn’t stop there. By Saturday, Israel had bombed oil refineries, power stations, and energy storage sites. Iran responded with a barrage of missiles and drones that reached Tel Aviv and Haifa, leaving 13 dead and dozens injured. In the middle of all this, Iran also hit pause on its nuclear negotiations with the U.S.

Against this backdrop, India’s decision to stay out of the SCO’s strongly worded statement which slammed Israel’s actions as violations of international law and a threat to global security raises eyebrows.

Is New Delhi leaning toward Tel Aviv? Or is it playing its usual geopolitical balancing game?

So, what exactly did the SCO say?

Founded in 2001, the SCO is a heavyweight bloc focused on security and political cooperation. Its members include China, Russia, India, Iran, Pakistan, and several Central Asian nations. Iran, interestingly, was the most recent country to join – under India’s chairmanship no less – in 2023.

This time, with China at the helm, the SCO issues some strong words. It condemned Israel’s airstrikes inside Iran, especially those hitting civilian targets like energy facilities and transport links. The attacks, it said, weren’t just a breach of Iranian sovereignty but that they also posed a serious risk to global peace and stability. The statement extended condolences to Iran and stressed that only diplomacy should guide any resolution around its nuclear programme.

Yet, India opted to stay on the sidelines.

India’s Diplomacy, Deals, and Dilemmas
When Israeli warplanes struck targets deep inside Tehran, New Delhi didn’t exactly leap into the fray. Instead, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar got on the phone with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, to do what diplomats do best – express “deep concern” and gently urge restraint. He called for calm, pushed for a return to diplomacy, and made it clear that India wasn’t thrilled about the direction things were heading in.

The Ministry of External Affairs followed that up with a formal statement – the usual measured language, nothing fiery. It noted that India was “closely monitoring the evolving situation,” especially reports involving hits on Iranian nuclear facilities, and urged both sides to dial things down and use existing diplomatic channels. The statement also reminded everyone that India has “close and friendly ties” with both Israel and Iran and stands ready to support peace efforts, a line that sounds neutral on paper, but politically, is anything but.

This is classic India-on-the-fence diplomacy, as India’s situation is unlike most other SCO members. Why – because New Delhi has skin in the game on both sides.

On one hand, India is Israel’s biggest weapons customer and not just historically. In 2024, as the war in Gaza intensified, Indian arms manufacturers were reportedly selling rockets and explosives to Israel. On the other hand, India is deeply invested in Iran’s Chabahar Port, a linchpin project for its ambitions to gain direct trade access to Central Asia and bypass rival Pakistan.

So yes, it’s a balancing act — and not an easy one. India’s approach is to walk the tightrope without falling off, trying to keep both its defence and trade priorities intact.

After the SCO released its statement condemning Israel’s actions in Iran, New Delhi made it clear it wasn’t on board. India hadn’t been part of the discussions leading to that joint statement, and instead communicated its own position privately to the group. It was, in effect, India saying: “We’ve got our own stance, thanks.”

So is India Leaning Toward Israel?

Not officially. But optics matter and by staying out of the SCO’s condemnation, India did blunt its impact.

That wasn’t the only instance. Just a day before, India abstained from a United Nations vote on a resolution calling for an immediate and permanent ceasefire in Gaza. That move, too, raised eyebrows, while many called it “perplexing” especially at a time when India’s public support for peace would seem like the obvious stance.

But behind that abstention might be a cold calculation. India is working toward a trade agreement with the United States, and with President Trump back in office (and threatening steep tariffs on Indian exports), New Delhi likely didn’t want to ruffle feathers in Washington. Especially not with a crucial July deadline looming.

Likewise, the SCO dynamics also reveal India’s awkward position in the bloc. While Russia and China are staunch Iran allies, India has far deeper ties to the U.S. and Israel. That puts it at odds with the more anti-West posture of much of the SCO, making New Delhi feel like something of an “outlier.”

Iran, Sanctions, and the Chabahar Headache
All of this gets even trickier when you factor in U.S. sanctions. Before the U.S. pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal back in 2017, Iran was India’s third-largest oil supplier. But with Trump back in the White House and pressure on Tehran ramping up, things are getting sticky again.

In February, Trump reimposed harsh economic sanctions on Iran, including revoking waivers tied to the Chabahar port, a project that’s central to India’s regional strategy. During his first term, India had managed to secure a carve-out from these sanctions for Chabahar. This time, no such luck.

That puts India’s multi-million dollar investment and its hopes of bypassing Pakistan for trade access to Afghanistan and Central Asia in serious jeopardy. Chabahar was supposed to be India’s golden ticket to influence in the region. Now, it’s becoming a liability caught in a geopolitical minefield.

Still, India isn’t ready to throw in the towel on Iran. Beyond oil or the port, Tehran offers strategic geographic value. Iran is India’s bridge to Central Asia – a region critical for trade, energy security, and counterbalancing Chinese and Pakistani influence. Which means, despite U.S. pressure and Israeli alignment, India can’t afford to completely alienate Iran either.

Is India Playing With Fire by Drifting from Russia?
In trying to juggle its strategic ties with the U.S., Israel, and Iran, India may be slowly burning bridges with an old friend it could one day sorely miss: Russia.

Let’s not forget  – Russia wasn’t just another voice in the SCO condemnation of Israel’s strikes on Iran; in fact it was one of the loudest. The Kremlin spoke straight and strong – calling the attacks a “violation of international law” and a direct threat to regional peace. And unlike India, Moscow didn’t sit on the sidelines; it took a firm, public stand.

Now, this wouldn’t have caused such discomfort a few years ago when the Russia-India partnership felt time-tested and immune to the daily flux of world affairs. But we’re not in that world anymore.

Russia is shifting east and fast. Faced with Western sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and the ongoing war in Ukraine, Putin has tightened his embrace with China, deepened military coordination with Iran, and even found common ground with North Korea. In this emerging anti-West bloc – call it the “Axis of the Sanctioned” – Russia is no longer acting like a lone power; it’s bonding with countries that don’t mind shaking the global order.

So, where does India fit into this puzzle? Increasingly, it doesn’t or at least, not comfortably.

By refusing to align with Russia and others in the SCO on the Iran-Israel crisis, India sent a message, even if unintentionally: “We’re not fully with you on this one.” That hesitation may be understandable from New Delhi’s perspective, given the weight of its defence deals with Israel and trade interests with the U.S, but it’s a move that won’t go unnoticed in Moscow.

What Could It Cost India?

Well, Plenty –

Strategic Leverage in the Region: Russia remains a dominant power in Central Asia, a region India desperately wants to tap into – for trade, for energy, and to counterbalance China’s grip. Alienating Moscow could mean losing access to influence in areas where India already struggles to project power.

Defence and Arms: While India is slowly diversifying its weapons imports, Russia is still its largest arms supplier. It’s not just about tanks and jets, it’s about maintenance, spare parts, joint projects, and decades-long interoperability. If Moscow starts looking at New Delhi through a colder lens, defence ties could suffer.

Energy Access: Russian crude, even amid sanctions, became a lifeline for India after Western prices surged. If political chill creeps into this relationship, energy flows could face friction especially if Moscow starts favouring China further or seeks more exclusive deals with Iran.

Being Left Out of the Bloc That’s Getting Louder: The China-Russia-Iran-North Korea axis may not be a formal alliance, but it’s clearly positioning itself as a counterweight to U.S.-aligned democracies. If India continues sitting out of major geopolitical flashpoints involving these players, it risks being seen as an unreliable swing state – too cozy with the West to be trusted, and too indecisive to be a true partner.

Russia Turning to Pakistan: Moscow has already shown signs of warming up to Islamabad – something unthinkable a decade ago. Russia and Pakistan have conducted joint military drills and begun talks on energy cooperation. If India sidelines itself, it may inadvertently push Russia closer to its arch-rival.

The Last Bit – India’s Widening Gap?

Yes, India doesn’t have to pick sides blindly. Strategic autonomy is the cornerstone of its foreign policy. But there’s a difference between playing neutral and being absent.

In a world that’s rapidly reorganizing into blocs again, India’s hesitation to side with its long-standing ally, especially when that ally is under pressure and consolidating alternatives, could leave it isolated when it finally does need backing.

And for all of India’s growing closeness with the U.S., Washington isn’t shy about transactional diplomacy. When its own interests shift, so do its alliances. Russia, for all its flaws, had been a consistent partner for decades – in defence, diplomacy, energy, and global forums.

In the long run, India may find that by trying to keep everyone happy, it risks losing friends who expected at least some public loyalty when it mattered.