SCO And India’s Geostrategic Needs

SCO And India’s Geostrategic Needs

In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, and India lost its largest political, military, and economic partner. The 1991 financial crisis in India, followed by a wave of Pakistani-sponsored terrorism against India between 1990 and 2008, led to terrorist mayhem in Mumbai.

All these were messy: the 2001 terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the US regime change policies. Having ignored Russia’s protests, NATO’s eastward expansion, the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991-92, and NATO’s invasion of Serbia in 1999 also had consequences.

As a result of India’s 1998 nuclear tests, we were subject to Western sanctions and were seen as a messy blow to the NPT. Several global problems have arisen from the Arab Spring, from the regime change in Libya in 2011 to the sanctions against Iran, which forced India to stop importing oil from its second-largest supplier.

There have been several factors contributing to the current Russian-Ukraine conflict, including the change of regime in Ukraine, China’s expansionism in the Pacific, China’s intrusion into our neighborhood, violation of all existing Indian border agreements, the massing of troops at our border, clashes in Ladakh, sanctions imposed by Western nations following the Ukrainian military intervention, and the declaration of Russian and Chinese adversaries.

The global mess is a result of all of these factors. If NATO, the EU, the G7, and the G20 were used to attack Russia, it isn’t surprising that Defence Minister Shoigu would attack the West at the SCO meeting. The West tried to contain China and labeled the QUAD and AUKUS as signs that the US was forming blocs.

President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov have repeatedly stated the same thing at the level of Shoigu. It has been public that we disagree with Russia on the QUAD. We should take exception to some European nations who blame us for not blaming Russia for the invasion of Ukraine.

We have been criticized for buying discounted Russian oil. While under pressure, we have not bowed to it and pursued our national interests. In contrast to our position on QUAD, with which we disagree, Russia’s position on QUAD is directed at the US, and we are not singled out for criticism as a partner in the US strategy.

As a result, the West targets us explicitly regarding our positions in the Ukraine conflict and calls for us to weaken our ties with Russia. Is our relationship with Russia only transactional and driven by defence and oil interests? India’s serious policymakers are informed that Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

Regardless of the rights and wrongs involved in the Ukraine conflict, are our serious policymakers ignorant of the factors that led up to it, such as NATO expansion, the overthrow in 2014 of the legitimately elected Ukrainian president, and the failure to implement the Minsk agreement for more than a decade?

We should not be so judgmental about Russia’s actions in Ukraine if we have overlooked all of the excesses of US and European policies in West Asia, including the handover of Afghanistan to the Taliban, the approval of $450 million in military aid for F16 upgrades to Pakistan in September 2022, etc.

We should build strong ties with the US and Europe in our national interest. The Ukraine conflict has hurt our interests, but we are not alone or have been more affected than any other country.

India is certainly not alone or has been hurt more than others by the Ukrainian conflict. The damage we have suffered is less than that many others suffered. Food, fuel, and fertilizer shortages have disproportionately hit poorer African countries. Germany, in particular, has suffered from Europe’s breakup of energy and other ties with Russia.

Since interest rates have increased and recession fears stalk the US and European economies, it is important to study how much inflation is resulting from the West’s determination to isolate Russia economically, defeat Russia militarily, and remove Putin from power.

India has been hit harder by Western sanctions on trade and payment systems. It is inaccurate to claim that economic conflict had caused the US to awaken to China’s danger, as it was identified as a threat long before Russia intervened in Ukraine.

The growing presence of China in the South China Sea and Xi Jinping’s determination to challenge US supremacy contributed to this trend. There was already a growing awareness of China’s threats during Trump’s presidency.

As Vice-President Pence said in 2018, China represents the whole of government to the US. Despite China’s hostile policies against India, the Chinese Defence Minister underplayed these at the SCO meeting, saying that issues between the two countries were under control.

This is consistent with the position China has been taking in recent months. According to our Foreign Minister, our relations between the two countries can only become normal if the border situation improves.

We know the Chinese position since 18 military/diplomatic discussions have occurred. Chinese diplomats want to divert attention from their aggression in the Himalayas by claiming they are on a peace mission.

Pakistan’s position of claiming to be a peaceful country will not convince the general population of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The SCO and BRICS, as well as other forums, have been the focus of India’s efforts on the terrorism issue.

Members of the SCO share concerns about terrorism, as seen in the SCO’s Regional Antiterrorist Structure. We should not expect the SCO forum to share our worries beyond a point since no international agreement has been reached, even at the UN, about how to define terrorism.

Pakistan is shielded from India’s terror threats but pressured over its Uighur terror concerns. US ambiguity regarding Pakistan’s terrorist affiliations is apparent from its decision to reach out to Pakistan as part of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan.

Using the SCO as an indirect pressure tool, we can indirectly press Pakistan against the Pakistan-Afghanistan Islamist axis. In assuming that the real focus of India’s diplomacy is on the Quad and that engagement with the US and G20 is much more valuable than SCO meetings, one is overlooking that India cannot opt out of an Asian/Eurasian organization.

Afghanistan, Belarus, and Mongolia are the three observer countries, and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Qatar are the nine dialogue partners. How important is the broader neighbourhood to us? We must maintain an international diplomatic footprint to match India’s rising stature.

The leadership of the Global South is, in that case, also a needless distraction from our QUAD and US ties and our G20 ties. Imposing an objective evaluation of India’s overall national interest in the country would require India to separate rhetoric from substance. 

Published by : Aliya Khan